

**THE US PEACE INITIATIVE OF 1991 TO SOLVE THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY**

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Dedication

I dedicate this work to my loving family for all their support in helping me attain one of my life's greatest achievements.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Hasan Al-Momani, for his support, patience, and encouragement throughout my research. His technical and editorial advice was essential to the completion of this thesis.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to analyze the American peace initiative of 1991 and the subsequent peace talks between Arabs and Israelis. Although many scholars have discussed this peace initiative and the subsequent peace talks between concerned Arab parties and Israel focusing on different primary and secondary variables of these talks. However, this thesis analysis the same variables according to their positivity as well as limitation to the American peace initiative.

The thesis has attempts to offer an analysis to the initiative as a dynamic process that was influenced by pre-existing conditions, process factors related to the timing of the peace initiative, American role as well as disputants motives. To that end, the study adopted a contingency approach encompassing all of these variables to determine their cumulative impact as well as the relations that existed between them. This thesis assumes that the American peace initiative of 1991 was a successful one and in the conclusion the thesis suggests that the peace initiative was successful in the sense that it generated a wider Arab-Israeli peace process and many agreements particularly between Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians.

Introduction:

Peace initiatives can be taken either by the disputants or through the intervention of a third party. However, the likelihood of the latter doing so is much higher than the former, particularly in protracted conflicts where adversaries have invested huge resources in their dispute and have developed misperceptions of each other. A shift from war to peace is a source of potential problems for the concerned parties in the sense that it involves recognition of a new situation and reassessment of basic attitudes and values. Moreover, the antagonists may regard such shift as a sign of weakness. Furthermore, in a protracted conflict the strong feelings of mutual distrust and hatred may bring one party to perceive any openness by his opponent as deception and a tactic planning to bring an advantage to the adversary. Therefore, outsiders make most of the attempts to initiate peace in protracted disputes. This view is based on empirical research about 79 international disputes of which 44 were mediated. However mediation is not always successful. Effective third party intervention requires a number of conditions which are related to the adversaries, the nature of their dispute and the mediator itself. The elements associated with the latter are the mediator's motives, the timing of the intervention and the characteristics of the third party such as impartiality, skill, knowledge of the conflict, and leverage. These influences will be highlighted in the following analyses of the American peace initiative of 1991 and will serve as a conceptual framework for the discussion of the U.S. peace intervention.

For many years the Arab- Israeli conflict has been one of the most complex issues that received much attention and efforts from international community particularly UN. Since inception of the conflict in 1948, the international community maintained active involvements to manage and solve this prolong conflict. Some of

these efforts produced partial successes in the form of partial agreements between Israel and some Arab parties like Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. However, the conflict remained short of comprehensive settlement.

Geopolitical developments in the Middle East as well as in the world that took place late 80s and early 90s of the last century provided an enticing opportunity to initiate peace initiative in order to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The peace process became possible at that time due to international and regional developments that smoothed the way for it, such as the Palestinian Intifada of 1987, the end of the Cold War 1989, the collapse of communism in East Europe, and the second Gulf War of 1991.

On the 6th March of 1991, President George Bush addressed a joint session of the American Congress in which he cited four challenges to Middle East stability and how to deal with them. Chief among them was the Arab-Israeli conflict. He called for “Comprehensive peace which must be grounded in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for both Israel’s security and recognition, and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would fail the twin tests of fairness and security. The time has come to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict”. Shortly after, Secretary of State, James Baker began intensified contacts with the concerned parties to translate Bush’s peace initiative into action. Between March and October of 1991, Baker visited the region eight times and successfully managed to get the approval of Israel and the concerned Arab parties as well as the international community to hold an international peace conference. Subsequently Madrid Peace Conference was held on 19 October 1991 with joint American-Soviet sponsorship.

Only few Arab countries such as Iraq, Libya and Sudan did not support the American move.

In the aftermath of Madrid Peace Conference the concerned parties agreed to move their peace talk to Washington. Henceforth, Israel and the relevant Arab parties (Jordan, Palestinian, Syria and Lebanon) had engaged in a bilateral peace negotiations. These negotiations produced some agreements like Oslo Interim Accords of 1993 between Israel and the Palestinian and Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of 1994. Parallel to these bilateral negotiations, the concerned parties with the support of international community initiated Middle East Multilateral Peace talks in which Israel and many of the Arab countries as well as international community participated in.

The initiation of Bush peace initiative and its success in initiating Arab-Israeli peace talks which started in 1991 and resulted in many peaceful agreements between Tel Aviv and some Arab parties has generated many questions. Chief among them is how much success this initiative had achieved? Therefore, this thesis intends to investigate the Bush peace initiative and try to answer such question.

The Importance of the Thesis:

The importance of this thesis derives from the fact that it deals with the Bush peace initiative of 1991 which was the most important initiative through out the history of the Arab – Israeli conflict. Moreover, this initiative generated a wider peace process between Israel and the concerned Arab countries that produced some agreements particularly between Israelis and Palestinians.

The Purpose of the Thesis:

The primary aim of this thesis is to analyze the different circumstances and conditions that made US to launch its peace initiative of 1991 and to explain and investigate whether the initiative was successful or not.

Literature Reviews:

Lukacs ,Yehuda and Said , Abdul Aziz , 1991 , wrote that It should surprise no one that the American initiative for an international peace conference on the Middle East has not been met with the enthusiasm it deserves among Israelis and Arabs. They added that a considerable amount of work is being done, but the inspiration of a long-term vision of peace is missing. In the absence of a charismatic leader in the Middle East, only President George Bush can offer that vision, The American president should get involved personally in the process before convening the conference. The conference should be regarded as a means of reaching the goal of creating a new order in the Middle East based on economic viability, political coexistence and cultural pluralism; they think that Bush ought to pursue public diplomacy by presenting his vision of peace in a direct message to the peoples and governments of the Middle East. This should call for common security for the people and states of the region as well as concrete steps toward a regional arms control regime.

Smith, Charles D. 1996, thinks that true peace as opposed to the promise of officially – sanctioned peace, remains a distant hope with many pitfalls prior to realization but the fact that it is being considered at all is a major achievement, he added that Madrid talks were historic in that the participant engaged in official direct

negotiation for the first time, the talks produced little progress except between Israel and Jordan, the Palestinian and Israeli remained far apart.

Curtiss, Richard H. 1991 wrote in his article that President George Bush must decide whether or not to defy conventional first term political wisdom and move the Israeli Palestinian problem to the top of his foreign policy agenda now, or tread water in the Middle East until after he is re-elected in 1992. It appears that Secretary of State James Baker is recommending that he go ahead, because it is a problem that won't wait. The conventional wisdom says that a president, who takes on Israel's powerful lobby, with its overt support in Congress and its covert support in US media boardrooms and newsrooms, had better be able to devote full time to the effort.

He continued that the greatest problem for any US president contemplating such a move remains the media. Without minimizing that problem, its seriousness will depend completely upon the reaction, In this situation, only a shallow concept of solidarity would lead American Jews to reflexively 'circle the wagons' around an irrevocable 'no.' Thoughtful friends of Israel know that the future of the Jewish state ultimately depends on movement toward a political settlement and will urge their Israeli counterparts to seize what may be an historic opportunity to begin negotiations. He wondered will President Bush defy conventional wisdom. If he does, he may find support in unlikely places. These include some of the Islamic states previously most critical or skeptical of the United States. They also include the US Congress, large sectors of the Israeli public, and, perhaps, many heretofore silent US Jews and critical journalists.

While the mainstream press assures the public that the Bush-Baker peace initiative was naive and doomed to failure, Bush may therefore be poised to prove it

wrong. The peace initiative is neither naive nor doomed if the president of the United States personally and irrevocably commits himself to it.

Eisenberg and Caplan, 1998, Cunningham, 1998, Lukacs, 1999, Alkadri, and Abu –Odeh suggested that the timing of the US peace initiative in 1991 strongly influenced the subsequent Arab-Israeli negotiation. The gulf war, the end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the US efforts contributed greatly to the initiation of the Arab-Israeli peace process of 1991. The new regional and international climate propelled the concerned parties to enter talks. Moreover, the end of the cold war and the demise of the Arab states' soviet sponsor dictated a degree of Arab accommodation with the sole remaining superpower, which in turn required Arab reconciliation with Israel.

Although the aforementioned writers have made a valuable contribution to the study of the Arab-Israeli peace talks particularly US peace initiative of 1991, an analysis to their writings suggests that they have dealt insufficiently with some aspects of these talks. Much of the literature gives the impression that US was the key actor in these talks and attributed the success of bush's peace initiative of 1991 to Washington' efforts. Therefore, investigating the role of other parties in these talks and their acceptance to the US initiative would be an additional task of this thesis.

Hypothesis:

This thesis argues that Bush peace initiative of 1991 was one of the most important mediatory efforts and that it was successful enough to initiate a wider Arab-Israeli peace process for the first time in the history of the conflict. Without this initiative, Arab-Israeli peace talks with Israel of 1991 would not have happened at that particular time. Moreover, this study argues that the initiative was successful because

it produced peace agreements between Israel and some Arab parties like Jordan and Palestinians.

Methodology and Conceptual Framework of the Thesis:

This thesis is based on an empirical analysis of the literature dealing with the different variables that explain the American peace Initiative of 1991 to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict and its outcome. In order to achieve the aims of the thesis it is important to comprehend the details of such peace initiative and subsequent developments within the Middle East peace processes which started in 1991. This is found in official publications, studies related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, American peace initiative of 1991 and analysis related to the larger Arab-Israeli peace talks that started in 1991 including its regional and international dimensions.

Since American peace initiative of 1991 was part of American efforts to initiate negotiation process between Arab parties and Israel, this study intends to discuss and analyze the themes of the thesis within an approach derived from literature on conflict resolution capable of encompassing the thesis arguments. This approach is Contingency Approach which compel to focus on the mutual relationship between mediators and disputants and give us the ability to describe and analyze different stipulated variables, attributes and relationships in the search for factors which compare with successful outcomes which suggests that negotiation takes place in three time dimensions: Past (refers to the factors which existed prior to the initiation of the negotiation), Present (deals with the influences that occur during the negotiation) and Future (concerns the outcome of the negotiation such as failure or success).

Difficulties of the Study:

Assessment can be a tricky and critical task, it can be classified in many different ways as objective, subjective or others, it depends on the knowledge, skills, attitudes and beliefs of the assessor.

The assessment process is a critical role to play. The reason for any assessment is to determine the strengths and weakness of the case study, and in our case to evaluate the success or the failure of the American initiative for peace process. Each scholar assess the American initiative according to his point of view, some says it represented promising opportunities for the region, and that relations were established at different levels of intimacy and cooperation with many countries, others thought that resolving the conflict required a strengthened international cooperation and others went that the initiative wont be doomed if the president of the United States personally and irrevocably commits himself to it.

Structure of The study:

The thesis is structured as follows: Apart from the introduction and literature interpretation, Chapter one will be devoted to the analysis of Bush Peace Initiative of 1991 and Madrid Peace Conference of 1991. Moreover, Chapter two will deal with the Middle East Peace Process of 1991 including peace agreements between Israel, Jordan and Palestinians, subsequently will be the conclusion

Chapter One

1. U.S Middle East Peace Initiative of 1991 and the Concerned Parties' Motives:

Early 90s of the last century witnessed a major change in the Arab-Israeli conflict in which a peace process between Israel and the concerned Arab parties was initiated in 1991. Since 1945, United States have always played an active role as a mediator in many international conflicts particularly in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some of the American peaceful efforts in this conflict were partially successful such as the troops disengagement between Egypt, Syria and Israel in the aftermath of October War in 1973 and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty of 1979, while other attempts failed. However, the US peace initiative of 1991 and the subsequent Middle East peace conference that was held in Madrid in October of the same year represented the most serious attempt on the part of Washington D.C to promote comprehensive peaceful settlement between Arabs and Israel.

On the 6th of March 1991, the peace process began through former United States President George Bush's speech to the Congress He called for "Comprehensive peace which must be grounded in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and recognition, and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would fail the twin tests of fairness and security. The time has come to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Gerner, 1994, p 180). After a short period of time, Secretary of State then, James Baker began his visit to the region where he met the concerned parties to translate Bush's peace initiative into action. Baker made eight trips to the ME between March and October, each of which included meetings with the leaders of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria,

along with talks with a Palestinian delegation in Jerusalem. During his visits to the region he tried to resolve barriers to initiating talks. However, in the first stage although he received the approval of the parties over the necessity to find a solution to their conflict, there was a sharp difference over the issue of the format of the negotiation, the formula and the Palestinian representation (Neff ,1991, p3) .Israel continues to refuse to consider a trade of land for peace and called for direct bilateral negotiations with the concerned parties parallel to enlarged regional talks aimed at building confidence between the Arabs and Israel without external interference (Morris, 2000, p 614). Meanwhile, a number of Arab countries say they will attend only as long as its goals are based on United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, which call on Israel to return Jordanian, Syrian and Palestinian lands it has occupied since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Among other issues that remain unsettled are what if any connection Palestinian representatives would have to the Palestine Liberation Organization, where the conference would take place and whether the Soviet Union would attend, the Arab position regarding this issue was unclear and ambivalent. Some Arab countries, particularly the Gulf States and Syria, conditioned their continued support for the PLO by the replacement of Arafat as its chairman (Sayigh, 1991, p 19). This was because of the latter's position during the Gulf Crisis. Israel from its part insisted that no one from the PLO, the Palestinian Diaspora, Jerusalem, or members of the Palestinian National Council could represent the Palestinians (Gerner, 1994, p 172). She would only negotiate with Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza strip as part of the joint delegation with the Jordanians. Moreover, Shamir former prime minister for Israel conditioned the Palestinian participation in any proposed negotiation with the end of their uprising.

The Bush administration was determined to create an atmosphere that could initiate a peace process in the Middle East (Quandt, 1993, Pp 401-402). The key breakthrough on the Arab-Israeli peace process came in June and was confirmed directly during Baker's sixth trip in July: Syria accepted the US proposal for direct talks at a peace conference. That step, Baker commented, "gives us something to work with." He then pressed Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians for their agreement to attend. "In our view," he said, "the Palestinians have the most to gain from a viable and active peace process than do almost anyone else." Baker also said to Israel, "This is a moment of historic opportunity [since] Israel now has Arab partners willing to engage in direct negotiations." (International Herald Tribune, 19 July and 3-4 August, 1991; The Economist, 20 July, 1991; Text of Baker's remarks in Jerusalem, 22 July, 1991.)

During a visit to Israel in August 1991, Baker got its preliminary approval to enter negotiations in accordance with the US proposal (Smith, 1996, p312). Shamir conditioned Israel's acceptance with a satisfactory solution of the issue of Palestinian representation in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the endorsement by the Israeli cabinet of Bush's peace proposal. With this achievement only the issue of Palestinian representation was left unresolved. However, after intensified talks between the Jordanians and Palestinians, and Baker with the latter this issue was solved. In September 1991 the Palestinian National Council approved the US initiative and agreed to negotiate within a joint delegation with Jordan and also asked for an American letter of assurances. With the consent of all concerned parties the major part of Baker's mission was achieved.

The only issue which remained was the composition of the Palestinian delegation.

The PLO agreed that the negotiating team would be strictly from the occupied

territories and that its members would have no formal relation with the PLO. Moreover, no one would be included from East Jerusalem. However, an advisory group to the Palestinian team was formed from the Palestinians close to the PLO and from Jerusalem, which included members such as Faisal Husseini. This prompted the Israeli cabinet to endorse the initiative formally (Indyk, 1991, p 83).

As for the other Arab countries, particularly the moderates such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, they supported the US peace initiative and expressed their readiness to participate in the process particularly the Multilaterals (. Baker III , 1992, Pp24-25) .Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria also voiced their support as well as their readiness to take part in the proposed peace process. Only few Arab countries such as Iraq, Libya and Sudan did not support the American move. As for the regional and international support for the American peace initiative, all the countries and organizations that were invited had agreed to back and participate in the process including UN and EU.

1.1 The Motives of the Concerned Parties.

The term motives here refer to all interests and goals, which usually lead disputing parties to enter and engage in a mediation-negotiation process to end their conflict. Many scholars and practitioners in the field of international relations as well as conflict resolution have highlighted the importance of these motives in mediation and negotiation (Fisher, 2005, Pp. 83-84). Arthur Lall argued that "Although vital interests, as such, are not brought into negotiating forums very often, it is obvious that they must play an important part in negotiations (Lall, 1996, p. 153). However, the nature of the motives and their effect in peace talks varies. When parties are highly motivated to enter negotiation or accept mediation by a third party the chance of reaching successful peace talks is high (Kressel and Pruitt, 1985, p. 186.).

William Zartman and Saadia Touval suggest that conflicting parties accept third party intervention because they expect that the mediator would work in favor of their interests (Zartman and Touval, 1996, p. 450.). Moreover, disputing parties expect that mediation will bring gains more favorable than the outcome deriving from continued conflict. In addition, adversaries hope that third party involvement will produce a settlement when direct negotiation is not possible or will provide a better solution than can be achieved by bilateral talks. Zartman and Touval argued that disputants may accept and co-operate with the mediator if they feels that refusing to negotiate would cause even greater harm ((Zartman and Touval, 1996, p. 450). The harm could arise from the probability that costly conflict would be much prolonged or the would-be mediator would not offer its services in the future. The parties may also welcome mediation in the hope that it will reduce some of the risks entailed in making concessions and cost incurred in conflict while protecting their image and reputation.

Third party involvement may also provide guarantees for the eventual solution, which would reduce the likelihood of violating it

Rosenau identifies motives as all the factors that had been considered as internal sources of foreign policy and as the elements that enhance or limit the external behavior of societies (Rosenau, 19971, p. 96.). These factors may include the role of geography (Sprout, Harold and Margret, 1965, p.21.) or the role of other social, economic, cultural and psychological elements neither K” nor, Klaus, 1965 The War Potential of Nations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Part I and Part II.) .

Hence, Rosenau considers foreign policy as a reaction to both internal and external stimuli (Rosenau, 1971, p.98). On the other hand, Snyder identifies two kinds of motivation that propel the decision maker towards certain choice of policy (Bruk, Sapin, Burton, 1945, Pp. 68-117.). The first type of motives is the “*in order to*” motives which the decision maker acquire during his participation in the process of decision making, and which are intended to realize a certain state of affairs. The second type of motives is the “*because of*” motives which is composed of the discriminative choices the politician adopt during previous experiences (Bruk, Sapin, Burton, 1945., pp. 137-173). Here, it is necessary to mention that the analysts need not investigate the “*because of*” motives as a satisfactory explanation of foreign policy can be reached without investigating them (Rosenau, 1971, p. 263.).

Investigating the process of decision-making and the motives behind its rationale, Holsti emphasizes the domestic and international needs that help shape state motives rather than identifying them as unique objectives (Holsti, 1976, p.125.). On the other hand, Morgenthau defines state interest as an objective struggle for power and accentuates the importance of producing a successful political outcome while

minimizing the importance of identifying the underlying motives behind the action itself (Morgenthau, 1973, p.6.).

Similarly to Rosenau and contrary to Morgenthau, Holsti contends that analysts tend to ignore the domestic and international needs that shape the collective interests and values, which political units endeavor to achieve (Holsti, 1976, p.124.). Negating that external objective of states is defined only by power accumulation at the expense of others, Holsti contends that,

“ nation states are multi-purpose entities, whose objectives express no single factor such as a desire for power” but whose *“ behavior is conditioned by a combination of environmental (Systemic) characteristics, immediate actions by other states which impinge on the interests or values of the state in question, and domestic social and economic needs.”*(Rosenau, 1971, p. 241.)

Highlighting interests as major motives directing foreign policy, Rosenau identifies two dominant schools of thoughts dealing with the concept of a states' interest. The first school is identified as the objectivist, which assumes the existence of real and objectified national interests upon which the survival and prosperity of the state depend. Advocates of this school do not endeavor to depict how national interest is in accord with reality or direct the reader's conceptualization of national interest (Rosenau, 1971, p. 241.). Morgenthau, who defines interests from the perspective of the objectivist school, envisions *“interests in terms of power”* - power that provides its upholders with the ability to exert influence on others' behavior. Accordingly, a nation's major goal is to maximize power, power that is measured by its capability to pursue goals of overextension with the constraints imposed by other states' capabilities (Morgenthau, 1973, p. 241.).

On the other hand, the second school, the subjectivist, stands to shed lights on the limitations of the objectivist school (Rosenau, 1971, p.242.). Upholding the rationality of the decision maker, the realistic school neglects to identify the end or the goal that power seekers struggle to achieve while influencing the other party's behavior (Rosenau, 1971, p.242). Hence, the subjectivists assume that national interest is not an objective truth but "a pluralistic set of subjective preferences that change whenever the requirements and aspirations of the nation's members change." (Rosenau, 1971, p.242) .Therefore, national interest manifests through the choices undertaken by the decision makers of the state in regard of the fulfillment of the members' needs and goals.

Unlike democratic societies where subjectivist ideas manifest themselves in the political processes that take into consideration the needs of their populations, an authoritarian regime has to endorse decisions that serve the interests of the elites favoring them over those of the population (Anoushiravan, 2002. p 60)

1.1.1The Syrian Motives:

Different motives encouraged Syria to accept and participate in the Middle East peace process of 1991. Chief among them were those related to political, economic and security issues (Hartman, 1994, Pp 46-46). Domestically, Syria's political situation fluctuated between one of stability and chaos (. Fisher, 1997, Pp 931-937). Until 1971 the country had suffered from frequent unrest in which military coups characterized its national politics. However, since 1971 when President Hafiz Al Asad came to power, although as a result of a military coup, the country to some extent enjoyed a considerable stability. This does not mean that the country has not

suffered from domestic political instability. The events of the early 1980s in which a confrontation between the Islamists and the regime erupted are an illustration of this. There are many potential political threats that could disrupt the domestic stability in Syria (Hartma, 1994, p 46) although the regime is adapting an ideology of pan-Arabism through the ruling party, *AL Baath*, the fact that Asad is from the Alawi minority while the majority of the population are Sunni forms a potential threat to the regime. Moreover, Asad is seriously ill and failure to have strange successors able to control the situation in Syria could lead to political chaos. Furthermore, the Arab-Israeli conflict provided the regime with a political legitimacy in which Syria defended the Arab rights, however, a long stalemate in the conflict would form a heavy burden and could bring into question the legitimacy of the regime. Therefore, solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict in which Syria would get back its occupied territories would enhance Asad's domestic position and would facilitate the issue of succession. In early 1990's many believed in Syria that Basil, Assad's eldest son was expected to succeed his father, but he was killed in a car accident in 1994 (Van Dam, , 1996, Pp 129-130).

Regionally, apart from her relations with some radical Arab States, Syria has suffered from what could be called regional isolation (Lucas, 1991, p15). Syria's relations with moderate Arab countries have been always tense. She adopted a hard-line in dealing with Israel and relations with Turkey have been characterized by disputes over a number of issues. Further deterioration in Syria's regional position occurred in the 1980s.

The political dispute with Jordan and the PLO and the siding with Iran against Iraq during the war intensified the tension in her relations with most of the moderate Arab countries. However, in the early 1990s, Syria's regional position was enhanced as

result of the 1990-1991 Gulf War (Pipes, 1991, p 41). During the crisis Syria sided with those Arab countries particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states that stood against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. She even sent troops to Saudi Arabia and participated with the coalition forces in ousting Iraq from Kuwait. This enhanced her relations with the abovementioned Arab countries whom on March 1991 with Syria and Egypt issued the “Damascus Declaration” (Nasrallah, 1991, Pp20-21). The latter called for cooperation between the signatory countries in all fields. Moreover, the war resulted in the defeat of Iraq, Syria’s main Arab rival. Furthermore, Syria’s presence in Lebanon was consolidated when she suppressed the revolt of General Michael Awn in October 1990. This was probably done with tacit Arab, Israeli and American approval as a reward to Syria for her position against Iraq during the crisis.

As for Syria’s international position, during the cold war, Syria had enjoyed cordial relations with Soviet Union and the communist countries who provided political support to her in the international arena (Shad, Boucher, 1995, Pp 77-84). In 1981 she concluded a cooperation treaty with the former Soviet Union. In contrast, Syria’s ties with the West remained cold and some times tense. This was due to the Arab-Israeli conflict and Syria’s ideological discourse. The political hard-line which Syria adopted in dealing with Israel and the pro-west Arab countries and the support to the Palestinian radical factions lead to the west’s perception of her as a radical state and supporter of terrorism. For instance during the 1980’s relations with the US deteriorated, particularly during the Regain era, to the point where the Americans raided some Syrian military positions.

In the late 1980s, Syria lost the political support of the communist bloc as a result of the transformations that occurred in those states, particularly in the former Soviet Union (Rodman, 1991, p 11). This weakened Syria’s international position,

which increased her susceptibility to western pressure. However, the Gulf crisis of 1991 provided Syria with a golden opportunity to consolidate her position. Syria's objection to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the agreement to participate in the coalition forces opened up a new prospects lead to improved relations with the west, mainly the US (Pipes, 1991, p 41). Although Syria's position at the time of the American peace initiative of 1991 was to a certain extent satisfactory, failure to respond positively would endanger these short-term gains.

Despite the improvement of the relations with the US ,the latter still listed Syria as a supporter of terrorism an issue which could raised at any time, taking into consideration the absence of any international political support (Fisher ,2005, Pp 938-939). The Iraqi predicament and the way in which the US dealt with this were a good example for Syria of what she could face if she refused or obstructed the peace efforts. However, participating in the proposed Middle East peace negotiation would strengthen Syria's political position and would enable her to keep the already acquired short-term gains and also achieve long term ones. Moreover, to take part in a peace process in which she would play a major role would increase her regional political leverage among the Arab countries.

Another motive that attracted Syria to accept the US peace initiative of 1991 was security interests. It is probably true to say that Syria's relations with her immediate neighbors particularly Turkey, Iraq and Israel are always tense. This posed a direct source of threat to her national security and raised the likelihood of being at war with these countries. . Although she did not engage in direct military confrontation with Turkey and Iraq, both remained potential threats to her security. This made Syria to build considerable military force for which she relied heavily on former Soviet Union The latter provided extensive military aid and support and concluded military

agreements with Syria as part of their treaty of cooperation and friendship (Harris, 1994, p 2). Syria was striving to achieve what she had always advocated, strategic parity with Israel. However, the regional and international developments, particularly in Soviet Union made the latter to reduce its military aid and support to Syria, which weakened her military strength (Hermann ,1991, p 57).Moreover, the destruction of Iraq and the reluctance and the inability of other Arab countries to wage a war against Israel, provided the latter with military superiority. This left Syria in a critical military position compared to that of Israel. Refusing to participate in the peace process and accepting the status quo could lead to a war with Israel. To become involved in such a war, without considerable external military assistance, would have been disastrous for her. Therefore, the peace process provided valuable opportunity for Syria to avoid such a situation.

The final motives that attracted Syria to join the peace process of 1991 were economic ones. In terms of economic potential, Syria is a relatively weak state compared to her neighbors particularly Israel, Turkey, and Iraq (Harris, 1994, p 46). She has failed to develop an economic, agriculture and industrial base that could provide her with adequate economic status. This is because she lacks considerable natural resources reservations, such as oil. Moreover, the conflict with Israel and her desire to achieve strategic parity through buying arms mainly from the Soviet Union placed a heavy burden on its financial capacity. Furthermore, most of the water resources which she depends on particularly for irrigation are under external control which prevented her from having adequate amount of water needed to expand the agricultural sector. In addition to that, Syria's involvement in Lebanon placed her under economic burden. This situation caused Syria to be dependent on the assistance of Arab countries particularly oil producing countries as well as Soviet Union. The

former provided her with considerable financial aid as part of commitment to support the Arab parties that were in confrontation with Israel. The Soviet Union extended to Syria massive military and economic assistance. However, the 1980s witnessed a setback in the external assistance due to the decreased in the oil prices, which reduce the Arab financial Aid. Moreover, the deteriorating economic situation in the USSR led the latter reduce its economic assistance to Syria.

However, regional developments primarily the Gulf crisis of 1990, provided Syria with an opportunity to enhance her economic situation (Shad, boucher, 1995, p86). She received financial aid from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States as a reward for her position during the war against Iraq. Moreover, these states provided Syria with economic facilities such as opening their markets to Syrian manpower and products. The Gulf War opened up new prospects and increased the likelihood of foreign aid particularly from West Europe and the US. In the light of these economic rewards it was hard for Syria to refuse or obstruct the US peace initiative because this could result in disruption of these new economic prospects and might even increase Syria's economic isolation. Moreover, participating in the proposed peace negotiation with Israel would relieve Syria from the military expenditures, which would positively affect her economic situation. Furthermore, peace with Israel would prompt both US and the West to provide Syria with economic assistance as part of the regional arrangements and would also encourage foreign investment.

1.1.2 The Palestinians Motives:

A number of motives attracted the Palestinians to accept the US peace initiative of 1991. Chief among them were political ones in which the issue of achieving national self-determination and political independence is on the top of them

(DiGeorgio-Lutz 1998 ,Pp 125-128). Prior to the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, the Palestinians represented by the PLO enjoyed considerable political recognition (Smith, 1996, Pp301-306). The uprising in the West Bank and Gaza strip in 1987 and the subsequent PLO steps such as the recognition of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the dialogue with the US, enhanced the regional and international position of the PLO. However, the regional and international developments in the early 1990s caused a setback in the Palestinian political position, particularly that of the PLO (Benvenisti, 1995, p198). The transformations in the Soviet Union and the communist countries reduced the degree of their political support to the PLO. Their position towards the Arab-Israel conflict became pragmatic and empty of any ideological content. Moreover, the PLO position during the Gulf crisis eroded the regional and international political support particularly from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Europe and US who in 1990 suspended its dialogue.

In the light of this deteriorating political situation, the Palestinians left with no option but to accept the US peace proposal, taking into consideration the American determination to initiate a peace process and the greater likelihood of the participation of most of the Arab countries (Lalor, 1992, Pp13-15), Failure to take part could result in further deterioration and could even undermine the Palestinian rights and the PLO. In contrast, participating in the Peace process would enhance the political rights of the Palestinians and their claims for national self-determination. Moreover, peace would rehabilitate the PLO both regionally and internationally. Furthermore, Peace could lead eventually to the establishment of a recognized Palestinian state after Israel withdraws something which is at the top of the PLO priorities. In addition to this, peace with Israel could result in the latter's recognition of the PLO, which

consequently would give the latter an opportunity to play a major role in the predicted Palestinian State.

Economic motives also contributed to the Palestinian acceptance of the U.S initiative (Eisenberg and Caplan, 1998, Pp8-10). It is probably true to say that the Palestinians and their representative the PLO, throughout their struggle had received generous economic and financial aid, particularly from Arab oil producing countries and the Soviet Union. The major economic and financial supporters were Saudi Arabia and the Gulf State who in addition to that allowed the Palestinians to work and to establish business there. Those workers were compelled to deduct part of their wages as a tax to be given to the PLO. With this huge financial capacity the latter established certain institutions to fund and support Palestinians in the occupied territories. In addition to the emotional attachment, this enabled the PLO to secure the loyalty of the majority of the Palestinians.

The performance of the PLO during the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza strip was probably the best example of its financial ability. However, this did not last long when the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia suspended their financial aid and deported thousands of Palestinians workers as a result of their position during the 1990-1991 Gulf crises. Therefore, when the US initiated its peace proposal, the Palestinians were in a critical situation particularly those in the occupied territories and the PLO was no longer even capable of running its own institutions. Failing to respond to the American call would increase the misery of the Palestinians further and could undermine the PLO's legitimacy. In contrast, to participate in a peace process of which most of the Arab countries approved could result in the resumption of their financial aid. Moreover, peace negotiations with Israel that could achieve the latter's withdrawal from the occupied territories would attract the West to extend economic

assistance to the Palestinians. Furthermore, a peaceful solution to the Palestinian question would also attract foreign investors to the region.

Another motive that made Palestinian accept the US initiative, which could be included, was security one. As a result of their violent and non-violent struggle the Palestinians had suffered from a lack of security. Those who live in the occupied territories have always been liable to Israeli reprisal measures. The Palestinian Diaspora particularly the camp residents in South Lebanon lack the security due to the military retaliation policy which Israel followed in dealing with PLO military attacks. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 virtually paralyzed the ability of the PLO to wage massive military attacks. However, prior to the US peace initiative the Palestinians concern about security were high, particularly in the West Bank and Gaza strip. As a result of their activities against the Israeli forces, the numbers of Palestinians casualties were high. This security situation could therefore be considered as a motive for the Palestinians to participate in the Middle East peace process of 1991. Since by doing so, a peaceful settlement would end the violence in the West bank and Gaza strip, and stopping the Israeli attacks on Palestinian camps in Lebanon and on PLO personnel.

1.2.3 Jordanian Motives:

Jordan had a number of interests that attracted her to join the Middle East peace process in 1991, such as her foreign policy aims, the political survival of the regime, and her economic and security needs.

A number of political motives attracted Jordan to join the peace process in 1991. They related to Jordan's political existence as a state, which had been threatened by the Arab-Israeli conflict and the related developments in the region and

wider international arena. Since its establishment in 1921, Jordan had frequently faced challenges from neighboring countries to its legitimacy. However, the Arab-Israeli conflict and its ramifications were the most serious threats to Jordan's political stability, because geographically and demographically, she was the Arab country most affected by the conflict (Tal, 1997, Pp. 102-105). These threats came from Israel where Amman's political existence was seriously challenged when she entered into two major wars with Israel in 1948 and 1967 and a limited engagement in 1968 at a Al-Karamah.

An additional Israeli threat derived from the belief of the right-wing Likud party, that Jordan was the best place for a solution to the Palestinian problem because the leaders of that party advocated that the Palestinian state should be formed in Jordan (Shamir, 1984, p. 576). Ariel Sharon, who was one of the advocates of this notion, claimed that "Also, surely we must expose the lie of 'the right of the Palestinians'. It must be explicitly and loudly proclaimed by the government and the Knesset that Jordan has been and is the Palestinian state in the land of Israel." (Amadouny, 1992, p. 16.) This line of thinking was enhanced in the minds of the Likud leaders especially in the late 1980s when Israel faced two sets of pressure. One was the Palestinian uprising, and the other was Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union. Jordan was afraid that these problems might induce the Likud government to adapt the strategy of transferring the Palestinians in the West Bank to Jordan so to settle the new Jewish immigrants. This would disrupt its fragile demography and threaten its political stability. Moreover, in 1990/1, Jordan's security was damaged by the spillover from the Gulf conflict which severely affected its relations with the Gulf states and Western countries (Tal, 1997, p. 104.). Jordan's pro-Iraqi stance led to its political isolation at the Arab and international levels.

All the aforementioned threats formed the political interests which prompted Jordan to accept and participate in the peace process of 1991. A peace negotiation between the concerned Arab countries and Israel would give Jordan the former's political backing which was of crucial importance in any negotiation with the latter. Throughout the history of the conflict, the lack of Arab political backing for Jordan was one of the main obstacles in reaching a peace treaty with Israel. Moreover, peace with Israel would result in mutual political recognition, which would enhance and safeguard Jordan's political stability and eliminate Israeli right-wing ambitions in its territories. An Arab-Israeli peace process might also result in an Israeli-Palestinians understanding that would solve their mutual disputes, notably over the West Bank which consequently would minimize the Palestinian threat to Jordan. In addition to that, a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace process could be expected to include a peace agreement between Israel and Syria, which would reflect positively on Jordanian-Syrian relations, and would eliminate a major source of tension between the two countries. Participating in a peace process sponsored by the U.S. would also satisfy the Jordanian position that believed in the necessity of active U.S. involvement in any proposed Arab-Israeli negotiations. Successful talks would allow Jordan to restore cordial relations with the West, and the Arab Gulf States, which would enhance her political status.

Jordan is a small country with limited natural resources particularly in terms of mineral resources, Amman is relatively poor except in phosphates and potash. As for agriculture, Jordan is a semi-desert country which depends mainly on rainfall as the source of irrigation. This situation has caused fluctuations in her economy, which became highly vulnerable to developments in the external environment. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the regional developments were the factors that most seriously

affected economic conditions in Jordan. Part of this effect was positive while the other part was destructive; for instance the war of 1948 disrupted the Jordanian economy as a result of military expenditure, but developments in the post-war period were of great help to her economy in that she gained new economic resources due to unification with the West Bank.

Despite the continued tension as a result of the conflict, during the 1950s and mid 1960s, Jordan enjoyed economic growth, but, mainly because of the 1967 war, the situation changed dramatically, which resulted in heavy economic losses (Safran, Pp. 392-395.). Amman lost significant agricultural and tourist income because of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the migration of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the occupied territories to Jordan placed a heavy additional burden on her already troubled economy (Feiler, 1988, Pp. 46-47.) Furthermore, the political and military developments that occurred between 1968 and 1971 increased Jordan's economic troubles. The continued tension along the border with Israeli caused Jordan to increase her military expenditure and denied her the benefit of the fertile land of the Jordan Valley; however, this situation did not last long because of the economic developments that occurred after the 1973 war. The Arab oil embargo against western countries caused a tremendous increase in oil prices. This led to the enhancement of the Arab oil producing countries' economies, most notably the Gulf States with whom Jordan possessed cordial relations (Tal, 1997, p. 47.). Henceforth, Jordan's economy began to improve as result of the increased financial aid from the Gulf States and remittances from Jordanian workers in the latter.

Meanwhile, further growth in Jordan's economy resulted from the development in the Arab-Israeli conflict that took place in the late 1970s. In 1978 Egypt and Israel concluded the Camp David agreement, which was rejected by the Arab countries,

including Jordan, in the Baghdad summit of the same year. At this summit, the rich Arab countries decided to allocate financial aid to Jordan, Syria, and the PLO. Jordan was to get U.S. \$ 1.2 billion dollars yearly for the following ten years .Another development in the region which benefited Jordan was the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, whereby most of the latter's external trade was conducted through Jordan. However, the 1980s were sharply different in that Jordan began to face serious economic setbacks that resulted from domestic and external factors. During the 1970s Jordan failed to achieve success in certain productive sectors such as agriculture and industry. Most investments were spent on military needs and on the services sector which were non-productive in nature.

As for the external factors, the drop in oil prices after 1982 damaged the Gulf states' economies, which consequently affected Jordan's economy in terms of a sharp drop in financial aid from those countries. Moreover, the Iran-Iraq war began to form a heavy economic burden on Jordan due to the increased Iraqi economic troubles, which resulted in the termination of financial aid to Jordan (Karl-Heinz Kamp,1993, p. 170.) . This situation forced the government to seek external loans, notably from the U.S. Despite efforts to modify its economy, Jordan failed to stop the increased deterioration in the financial and economic situation, which triggered domestic riots in certain cities in 1989. Shortly after, in 1990, the second Gulf crisis erupted, which affected Jordan's economy severely.

Unlike the previous crisis, on this occasion Jordan almost lost its traditional financial and economic supporters, mainly the West and the Gulf countries. Thousands of Jordanian workers returned home mainly from Kuwait, which in time increased the rate of unemployment. Moreover, Jordan lost the Gulf market and the Iraqi one as well, as a result of the UN economic sanctions. However, after the second

Gulf War the political development in the region, mainly the U.S. peace initiative, formed an enticing opportunity for Amman to get out of this critical economic situation. Participating in a peace process that might result in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict would allow Jordan to achieve short and long-term economic aims. One of the former was the lifting of the Aqaba port blockade. The latter is Jordan's sole port which was besieged as a result of the UN sanctions against Iraq in that goods coming through it had to be searched. Another was the restoration of economic relations with the West and the Gulf countries and the possibility of writing off a substantial amount of its foreign debt, mainly by the United States . In the long term a successful peace process would eliminate the negative impact of the conflict on Jordan's economy, such as military expenditure and the migration of thousands of refugees and displaced persons. Moreover, a successful peace process would open up prospects for regional economic co-operation. (His Majesty King Hussein speech to the Jordanian national congress, October 12.1991)

In term of security threats, since its establishment, Jordan has suffered from direct military confrontations and from terrorist actions. Many of these threats came as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict while others relate to the developments in the region, most notably inter-Arab rivalry.

Although a *de facto* military understanding existed throughout much of the conflict, Jordanians viewed Israel as the major threat to their security whether directly or indirectly as a result of its military confrontation with the other parties in the conflict. This belief rested on two assumptions. One was about the structure of the conflict whereby one country, Israel was in opposition to the Arab states and the Palestinians. The second assumption concerned the hostile policies of the Israeli Likud party. As for the first one, except for the war of 1948, Jordan was dragged into

in most of military confrontations as a result of actions initiated by Israel or by the other concerned Arab countries. During the 1960s and early 1970s, Jordan suffered a lot from the Israeli reprisal policy which were initiated as a result of the Palestinian guerrilla's military actions against the latter.

Another major military confrontation that seriously challenged Jordan's security was the war of 1967 in that she found herself caught between the desire not to get involved with Israel in a military confrontation and the burden of her Arab commitments. As for the second assumption, in the 1980s, Jordanian security fears were enhanced as a result of the military actions conducted by the Likud government against certain Arab countries such as the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear installation in 1981 and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Further enhancement came as a result of repeated statements by the Likud leaders that Jordan is Palestine.

After pointing out the security threats that Jordan faced and its inability to meet them, it is easy to understand why the 1991 Middle East peace process attracted Jordan. A process that might result in a peace treaty with Israel would eliminate its potential security threat to Jordan and would put an end to the Likud illusions, which consequently would enhance its stability (Bearman, 1995, p. 130). Moreover, comprehensive peace negotiations might result in mutual agreements between the concerned Arab parties and Israel that would end the state of war among them. Such a development would relieve Jordan from its security commitments with the Arab countries against Israel and might even result in regional co-operation in the security field. In addition to that, a peace process with active U.S. involvement would lead to greater American commitment in terms of helping the parties to maintain their security, giving military assistance to the parties.

1.1.4 Israeli Motives

Israel has a number of long and short terms national aims, which she sought to, achieve. The priority given to these aims varied. Thus, the security and existence of the state are more important than some economic aims. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel succeeded in achieving some of these aims. For example she reached a high degree of industrial and economic capacity, but partly failed to do so with the other aims, most notably in terms of security. This was primarily because of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, which has been the major source of threat to her existence and security. However, the U.S. Middle East peace initiative offered Israel an opportunity to achieve her unattained aims. when Israel participated in the peace process of 1991, she was motivated by a number of related aims, chief among them being security which most of the Israelis have considered their top national priority (Barak, 1998, Pp. 60-62).

Maybe no other issue has dominated Israeli daily life more than their security this is because of the sense of insecurity that has developed as a result of their historical suffering, the holocaust and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The threats which came from the latter conflict were of two kinds: the personal one, in which certain attacks were directed against Israeli individuals and the military actions directed against the state. However, the core security dilemma of Israel lay in the structure of the conflict, in which the country had to deal militarily with a number of Arab countries that have opposed and challenged its existence right from the beginning. The conflict was perceived as a struggle between Judaism and Islam, which brought additional enmity to Israel from some Muslim countries.

Israel fought a number of wars: the war of 1948 with the Arab countries, the Suez war of 1956 with Egypt, the June war of 1967 with Jordan, Syria and Egypt, and

the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Egypt was perceived as by far the most serious threat to Israel because of its considerable military and demographic strength. However, the peace agreements which were concluded between them in 1978 and 1979 ended the state of war and thus greatly enhanced Israel's military security.

Another security threat came from Syria. She had been considered a military threat, either directly or through supporting Palestinian and Lebanese guerrilla actions against Israel. Since the disengagement agreement of 1975, Israel and Syria enjoyed a *de facto* security understanding regarding the Golan Heights. However, Syria continued to wage a proxy war through factions in Lebanon (Barak, 1998, Pp. 60-62). Jordan did not constitute a serious military threat to Israel because of its relative weakness compared to the latter. But Jordan's geographical location formed an ideal military base that could be used to launch an effective attack against Israel. This is because Amman has the longest borderline with Israel. Moreover, the latter lacks strategic depth in that the distance from its border with Jordan to the Mediterranean coast was quite short. Since 1971 a tacit understanding existed between both countries over the security issue. However, the unpredictability which characterized the Arab-Israeli conflict, led Israel to believe that Jordanian territory might be used by the other Arab countries, mainly Syria and Iraq as a launching base against her. Israel has therefore considered Jordan as a buffer state which formed part of its strategic depth, and has not been willing to tolerate any change to or violation of the status quo in Jordan.

The Palestinian danger to Israel was different from the other threats in the sense that this threat had two aspects namely internal and external. The former was represented by the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip and the latter derived from the PLO, such as Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Since 1967 these groups formed a threat for both the state of Israel and its citizens, through waging guerrilla warfare. . As for the threat of the Palestinians living in West Bank and Gaza strip, at the beginning the danger was merely random attacks against Israelis, mainly settlers. However, a change took place in 1987, which brought about the Palestinian uprising, a new danger that Israel had not experienced before. It was a mass resistance and relatively non-violent movement against the Israeli occupation, with a strong Islamic presence, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Due to its widespread popular participation, the *intifada* (uprising) formed a serious threat that forced Israel to double her security efforts in the occupied territories and to apply tough measures (Aronson, 1990, Pp. 323-348)

Another source of threat came from nearly distant countries, mainly Iraq and Iran (Ziarati, 1994, p. 17.). The latter became hostile to Israel when the Islamic revolution took place in 1979. This was expressed in the termination of Iranian oil supplies for Israel and through supporting Shiite factions (Hizbullah) actions against Israel in south Lebanon. Iraq also participated in most of the Arab wars which were waged against Israel, and extended military assistance to the Palestinian guerrillas. However, the Iraqi threat to Israel was most clearly expressed in the attack by Scud missiles in 1991.

The aforementioned security threats gave Israel strong motives to participate in the 1991 Middle East peace process. This is because a comprehensive peace settlement with Israel's Arab neighbors could have resulted in the elimination or at least minimization of the Syrian threat and the end of the security instability in southern Lebanon, which consequently would end the Hezbollah danger. Moreover, it might end the formal state of war with Jordan which would reduce the likelihood of Arab forces being stationed in Jordan. Furthermore, it could end or minimize the

external and internal Palestinians threats, such as guerrilla military attacks, and most importantly the Palestinian uprising with its security, political and moral burden on Israel (Eisenberg and Caplan, 1998, p., 9.). Lastly, and of great importance to Israel, a peace process with an active U.S. involvement would reinforce American security commitments to Israel (York, 1990, p. 11.).

To understand the political motives that led Israel to participate in the 1991 Middle East peace talks, a discussion of the political threats that she faced since independence is needed. Right from the beginning Israel was confronted with the problem of international and regional recognition, mainly from the Arab countries who challenged her political existence. Thus, political recognition has been considered as one of the most important aims on Israel's foreign policy agenda (Laurin, Mughisuddin and Wagner, 1977, Pp. 204-205). Despite the Arab countries' efforts to block the road to international recognition, the post-war period of 1948 witnessed major Israeli political achievements. She gained recognition from the United States and the Soviet Union, which consequently helped her to become a member state of the UN in 1949 (Draper, 1968, Pp. 5-6.). However, the 1950s witnessed the beginning of a serious Arab political challenge against Israel in the international arena. They succeeded in excluding her from the first Afro-Asian conference in 1955 (Peters, 1992, p. 1). Negative change also occurred in Israeli relations with the Soviet Union, primarily because of the latter's military assistance to Egypt in 1955. Consequently, Israel became associated with the West, initially with France and the USA who since then has been considered the main supporter of Israel politically, economically and militarily (Lieber, 1998, p. 3.). In addition, during the 1960s Israel achieved considerable political recognition through establishing diplomatic relations with the newly independent African states.

Meanwhile in the wars of 1967 and 1973, Israel faced a political setback when most of the African and the communist states severed their relations in reaction. Moreover, a new political challenge this time came from the UN. In 1975 the UN adopted a resolution which connected Zionism with racism . A slight positive change occurred in the Israeli international political position as a result of peace agreements with Egypt in 1979, but the 1980s witnessed a radical shift in the nature of the political challenges to Israel. The issue of Palestinian self-determination gained new momentum as a result of the European Community Venice declaration of 1980. Moreover, the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 aroused fierce international and internal criticism and in 1984 the UN endorsed resolutions that considered Israel “not a peace loving state” and decided to take economic, political and cultural measures against her. In addition to that a new political challenge for Israel emerged as a result of the Palestinian uprising in the late 1980s and early 1990s which in time gained domestic and international support. Its impact on Israeli internal and external policies was tremendous.

In the light of the aforementioned political threats that Israel experienced throughout the conflict and in the light of her quest to overcome them, she participated in the Middle East peace process of 1991. The first reason for this was that sitting with the Palestinians of the occupied territories would give them a hope that might cause the ending of the *intifada*. This was probably the primary Israeli political motive and negotiating directly with the concerned Arab parties would put an end to their political boycott and legitimize its existence as a Jewish state (Ikle, 1977, p. 365.). Furthermore, peace negotiations might result in a comprehensive settlement, which consequently would lead to a formal Arab recognition and normalization of their relations with her.

In the literature on negotiations it is acknowledged that disputing parties negotiate with each other to achieve certain aims such as economic interests (Iskander, 1973, p. 331.). Thus when Israel decided to participate in the peace process of 1991, she was hoping to achieve short and long term economic interests. Since her inception, the state has been economically challenged by the Arab countries, who, in 1949, decided to establish a boycott bureau to be supervised by a head office located in Damascus . The aim behind this action was to boycott Israeli products, which consequently would weaken her.

Apart from the aforementioned challenge, the military nature of the conflict required a great deal of expenditure that imposed an immense burden on the Israeli economy (George, 1997, Pp. 196-203.). According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Israel's military expenditure in 1990 constituted 12.3% of her gross domestic product (Peretz, 1991, p. 970.).

As a result of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the Palestinians in time became dependent on Israel. She monopolized the occupied territories market through exporting her products and provided job opportunities for thousands of Palestinians workers, mainly in the service sectors, such as construction. However, the 1987 Palestinian uprising damaged these economic relations. This was because some activities of the uprising were of a commercial nature, such as strikes and boycotts of Israeli products. Moreover, the tourist sector in Israel was severely affected because most of the historical and religious sites such as Bethlehem were located in cities which witnessed much of the uprising. In addition to that the continuation and the escalation of the *Intifada* forced Israel to double her security efforts, which consequently increased military expenditure that negatively affected her economy .Another event that coincided with the uprising was the influx of Jewish

immigrants from former communist countries, mainly the Soviet Union. In the late 1980s and as a result of the political developments that took place in these countries, a wave of Jewish immigrants began to arrive in Israel, forming a serious economic challenge for the country (Quandt, 1993, p. 402). Although, she had a relatively strong economy, Israel had difficulty in absorbing such a huge number of immigrants. They were in need of accommodation and jobs in accordance with their qualifications. To overcome this demographic and economic dilemma she sought U.S. help to provide her with a ten billion-dollar loan (Rusonik, 1992, Pp. 44-45.).

This was the Israeli economic situation on the eve of the U.S. peace initiative in 1991. She therefore decided to participate in the proposed negotiations with the concerned Arab countries for the following reasons. First, she would get the \$10 billion loan which probably was its immediate motive when the U.S. linked it with Israel's agreement to participate in the Middle East peace talks (Rusonik, 1992, Pp. 44-45.). Second, if the negotiations with the Arab parties were to result in a comprehensive settlement, the Arab economic boycott would be terminated which might lead to mutual economic co-operation. Thirdly, solving the conflict would pave the way for stable economic co-operation with the third world countries including Muslim countries, and consolidate economic links with the European Union, Israel's largest economic partner . Lastly, solving the conflict would end the Palestinian uprising, thus terminating its negative impact on Israel's economy and reducing Israel's military expenditure.

1.1.5 The Motives of Lebanon.

Prior to the US peace initiative in 1991, Lebanon achieved relative national conciliation and the civil war had virtually ended (Norton, 1999, p 41). In 1989 the

disputed Lebanese factions signed the Al Ta'if agreement which was sponsored by Saudi Arabia and blessed with tacit approval of the Americans and the Syrians (Hudson, 1999, Pp 27-28). The accord aimed at reforming the Lebanese political system and provided the state with an opportunity to strengthen its political authority and opened up the prospects for national reconciliation. Moreover, the ending of General Awn's mutiny relieved the state from a serious challenge. Furthermore, Lebanon's position during the Gulf crisis in 1991 increased the political support of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and the West. This improvement in the domestic and external situation of Lebanon improved the prospects for economic aid from the rich Arab countries and the West to reconstruct the country following the massive destruction of the civil war. Therefore, the US peace initiative was an additional opportunity for Lebanon to overcome political, economic and security problems. Peace with Israel would end its occupation of south Lebanon and this would allow the state to extend its authority and end the presence of armed factions in this area. Moreover, peace would attract foreign investment and aid, taking into consideration the fact that Lebanon had once enjoyed the reputation of being the Middle East centre of financial activity. Furthermore, comprehensive peace could end the Palestinian refugee issue which is a serious demographic problem for Lebanon. Stalemate in the conflict could lead to the settlement of those refugees in the country which would disrupt demographic fabric of the Lebanese society.

1.1.6 The U.S Motives:

Apart from their desire to bring peace mediators intervene in conflicts to achieve certain motives which represent their interests (Duncan, 1992, p 691). The nature of the hoped profits depends on who are the third parties and what kind of

dispute they are attempting to mediate. William Zartman and Saadia Touval have identified three categories of mediators in international conflicts such as super-powers, medium-sized powers and international organizations (Zartman and Touval, 1996, p 446). In regard to super-powers both scholars have distinguished two kinds of motivations. The first ones are defensive while the second are offensive ones. In respect to the former, states intervene when a dispute between other parties could pose a threat to their interests and to the relations with the disputants (Zartman and Touval, 1996, p 446). An escalation to the conflict may increase the likelihood of the involvement of additional parties including the mediators. Moreover, super-powers mediate to seek terms that would increase the prospects of stability deny their rivals opportunities for intervention. The offensive motivations are related to the desire of the super-powers to extend and enhance their influence, winning the gratitude of the conflicting parties or one of them (Zartman and Touval, 1996, p447). Mediation by middle and small size states may be motivated by the hope to consolidate their influence, prestige and sustain stability (Berridge, 1995, Pp103-104). International organizations intervene in conflict motivated by their duty which enshrined in their charters (Berridge, 1995, p 104).

The issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict has played an important role in the US foreign policy towards Middle East since 1948, particularly during the cold war (Lieber, 1998, Pp7-10). This is because the conflict has always been a source of disability to the region, which is of great importance to American national interests. This explains the constant US engagement in continued efforts to solve this conflict. Therefore, when Bush launched his peace initiative of 1991, he was influenced by a number of interests, which represented the US motives to propose peace process between Israel and its immediate Arab neighbors. Apart from the strategic geographic

location of the region, there are immediate American interests, which the US keen to keep or achieve. Chief among them is to secure an uninterrupted access to the oil of the region at a reasonable price (Fandy, 1998, p 5). Although the US is considered to be one of the countries with oil reserves, in time she has nevertheless become the world's largest importer of oil. Moreover, most of the US allies, particularly the West and Japan import large amounts of oil from the huge oil reserves of the Middle East. Therefore, any interference that could disrupt the flow of oil or lead to an increase in its price would have a sharp negative impact on the economies of the US and its allies. The reaction of coalition forces, particularly the US, against Iraq during the Gulf crisis shows, how far these forces could go to defend their interests in the region's oil. Although after the defeat of Iraq the immediate danger regarding the flow of the oil was minimized, the likelihood of the eruption of another round of war between the Arab countries and Israel has always been present. An unresolved conflict with a stalemate or an accidental incident could result in a military confrontation between the adversaries in which even the US allies in the region could have no option but to be involved. A war between Syria and Israel would put Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in a critical position in which they would find it difficult not to help their Arab ally who had stood with them in the Gulf Crisis.

The war of 1973 between Israel and the Arab countries and the subsequent increase in oil prices as a result of the oil embargo by the Arab producing countries illustrated this. Therefore it was in the US interest to launch a peace initiative that could end the conflict peacefully. Another interest that motivated the Americans to initiate a peace process is the safety and survival of Israel (Satloff, 1995, p 110). The US has an emotional attachment and moral commitment towards Israel. Both countries to a certain extent share common values, which make them close to each

other. Moreover, during the Cold War the US developed vested interests in Israel as a strategic ally against the intentions of the Soviet Union in the region. Furthermore, the Jewish lobby plays a central role in securing continued US commitment to the existence of Israel due to its influence within successive American administrations and the Congress. Although with the defeat of Iraq and the end of Cold War, eliminated the immediate dangers, the issue of threats to Israel's security remained valid. In the light of US enthusiasm to oust Iraqi troops from Kuwait, failure to address the Arab-Israeli conflict in the same way could result in radicalization in the Arab countries. Moreover, a continued stalemate could lead to a new round of war taking into consideration the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region. The result would be disastrous for both sides. Apart from the threat of mutual destruction, the peace between Egypt and Israel could be negatively affected. The former would find it difficult to stay neutral if a war erupted between Syria and Israel bearing in mind the new realities that had emerged during and after the Gulf war in which Syria came closer to the Arab moderates. Therefore, the security of both the region and Israel would be endangered. In the light of this, the Bush administration realized that only a peaceful solution could avoid this situation.

A further motive that made Bush launch a peace initiative to solve the Arab-Israel conflict, was the issue of the new world order in which the US plays a central role (Quandt, 1967, p 398). The end of the Cold War through the defeat of the communist bloc and the Gulf War of 1991 both enhanced the US role as the world leader. Peace in the Middle East brokered by the US would lead a further enhancement of the American global role. In addition to this, there was a motive related to Bush personally (Shlaim 1992, p3). The way he had dealt with Saddam and the subsequent victory had increased the popularity of Bush as a national and world

leader. Further achievements like the ending of the prolonged conflict between Israel and its neighbors could increase this popularity and could further enable him to win the next American Presidential elections.

The preceding discussion of the concerned parties' motives, suggests that Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians, Jordanians and the USA had compelling motives to accept and participate in the Middle East peace process of 1991. This was reflected in the significant interests which all parties hoped to achieve.

Chapter Two

2. The Madrid Peace Conference, 26 October, 1991 and the Subsequent Arab-Israeli Peace talks:

One of those issues that confronted the American administration during its quest to get approval for Bush's Middle East peace initiative concerned finding an acceptable place for the proposed peace conference. Tel Aviv preferred that the conference be held in the region (Shamir, Interview with *Al-Hayat* a London based Arabic newspaper, republished by *Al-Rai*, Jordanian newspaper, 21 July 1999, p. 10.) Arab parties rejected this and demanded that the conference should be held outside the region, preferably in the United States (Tarawneh and Masalha, 2005, Pp 97-115.) However, Washington D.C solved this issue when she proposed Madrid as the venue for the proposed conference (Shlaim, 1992, p. 4). Both Arabs and Israelis accepted the Madrid as a place for the peace conference.

On 18 October 1991, the U.S. and former Soviet Union issued an invitation to the concerned parties to attend the Middle East conference in Madrid (Quandt, 1993, p. 502). The invited parties were Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians within the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Although Egypt had enjoyed a state of peace with Israel since 1978, she was asked to participate in the conference. The Gulf Co-operation Council as well as the Arab Maghreb Union was invited. The European Community was also invited and was represented by its presidency. The UN was given the role of observer in the conference to which its general secretary sent a representative. The co-sponsors were to keep the UN general secretary informed about progress in the negotiations. The conference was chaired by the two co-sponsors and held at ministerial level.

On 30 October 1991, the Madrid conference officially opened in the Palacio Real with the presence of all the aforementioned parties (Satloff, 1995, p. 109). On the first day of the plenary session of the conference, the participating parties made their speeches, in which some were hostile and sharp while others were conciliatory. These speeches reflected the parties' initial positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. President Bush made the opening speech during which he outlined the U.S. position (Eisenberg and Caplan, 1998, p. 75). He called the parties to make territorial compromises and peace based on fairness to the Palestinians and security for the Israelis. Mr. Gorbachev presented the Soviet position and called on the parties to solve their long conflict through meaningful negotiations.

Shamir the former prime minister delivered a speech saturated with rhetoric from the past where he ignored territorial compromise and stated that the main cause of the conflict was not territory, but the Arab refusal to recognise Israel (Shlaim, 1992, p. 4). Shamir spoke of Syria as one of the most autocratic states in the world. Farouk Al-Shara, Syria's foreign minister made a radical speech in which he denounced Shamir's description of Syria and spoke of Israel as a terrorist state led by a former terrorist (Shlaim, 1992, p. 5.). Jordan's speech, delivered by foreign minister Dr Kamel Abu-Jabber, was characterised by moderation and conciliation (Dr Abu-Jaber). The most surprising speech came from Dr Abdul Shafi who headed the Palestinian team within the joint delegation with Jordan (Lalor, 1992, p. 12.). He called for the end of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and demanded that Palestinians should get their right of self-determination and he accepted the need for two-stage negotiation; transitional and permanent to solve the Palestinian question.

Lebanon's foreign minister delivered his country's speech, which was conciliatory in nature. In the plenary session which lasted three days, the parties failed to narrow the gap between them, with Israel offering no prospect of withdrawal from the occupied territories as the Arab parties demanded (Cossali, 2005, p. 65). However, the parties moved on to the bilateral talk's stage of the conference. Although little of significance was achieved during the Madrid deliberations, the conference was considered to be an important step on the road of the Middle East peace process (Tarawneh and Masalha, 2005, Pp 97-115.). Madrid was important for Israel in the sense that she sat down with all the concerned Arab parties, particularly the Palestinians, and the latter, got the opportunity for the first time to present their own case to the world.

2.1. Israeli-Palestinian Bilateral Peace Talks 1991.

One of the Major features that characterized the Palestinian-Israeli peace process of 1991 that it was conducted throughout two parallel tracks. One was the Washington based talks in late 1991 conducted by the Palestinian team from the occupied territories, while the other one secretly conducted in Oslo in early 1993 between Israel and the PLO. Therefore, the Washington track will be discussed first followed by the Oslo secret track. The end of the procedural contention over whether Israel would negotiate with a separate Palestinian delegation team or not had set the stage for a relatively independent Israeli-Palestinian bilateral peace talks in Washington in early 1992 (Shlaim , 1992, p 6).

Another feature that characterized the bilateral talks between the Israelis and the Palestinian, particularly during the Likud-led government era was that there was contention over the term of reference that was suppose to govern their bilateral talks.

Palestinians understood that UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 would be the bases for the talks as stated in the US letter of assurances to them, while the Likud government contested that (Abd Al-Shafi, 1993, Pp16-17). Therefore, during the first phase of the negotiation the Palestinians tried to establish a clear ground in which their talks with the Israelis would be conducted. Moreover, the Palestinians had tried to set the agenda and to define the issues that the parties would discuss. The Palestinian insistence on defining an agenda that would contain their aims and to get Israel's agreement over reflected the sense of urgency that the Palestinian had in mind during the first phase of the negotiation. Palestinians were afraid that Likud government would drag the negotiation for a long time as Shamir promised which would put the Palestinian in a critical situation and gain nothing from the peace talks (Nefe, 1994, p 64). Thus, the Palestinian delegation presented a proposal for the interim stage (Middle East International). The proposal evolved around that the interim period would involve an initial Israeli withdrawal from the populated areas to allow elections for a legislative assembly. This would be followed by a complete Israel withdrawal in mutually agreed phases to redeployment points in the occupied territories. Moreover, an end to the Israeli military and administrative control through transferring juridical and civil authority to the Palestinian Interim self-government Authority. Israelis had proposed the following points (Cossali,2005.p89). The interim arrangements should not prejudice the out come of the negotiation, it must deal with the people not with the status of the territories and the aim of such arrangements should keep the link between West Bank, Gaza and Israel. Moreover, the interim plan should keep the traditional relations between the Palestinian inhabitants and Jordan. Furthermore, Israel will continue its settlement activities every anywhere in the territories and that public order; external and internal aspects of life of the territories

will be continued to be the responsibility of Israel. An analysis to the above mentioned two proposals would show the sharp gap that existed during this phase of negotiation between Palestinians and the Likud government. Most of the Palestinian talks with the Likud government were conducted around these general lines. Nothing of specific importance was achieved. The Palestinian tried hard to get the American more involved in the negotiation through pressuring Israel to soften its position. However, the Americans were reluctant to practice an effective pressure on Israel except on the issue of halting settlement activities in the occupied territories through using the loan issue. The Americans advised the Palestinians to accept whatever the Israelis offer in regard to the autonomy issue and that the Palestinian had to give up focusing in general issues such as stopping settlements activities and human rights violations (Benvenist, 1995, p 176). Although the Palestinians and Israelis remained engaged in their bilateral talks until the period prior to the general elections which held in Israel in June 1992, both failed to achieve some thing tangible. The arrival of Labor and its allies to power and Rabin's pledge to reach an agreement with the Palestinian in short time had created a sense that breakthrough in the Israel-Palestinian talks was likely (Benvenisti, 1995, p172). In regard to the thorny issue of settlements which has an immediate concern to Palestinian Rabin classified the settlements into political and security ones. He promised to freeze the former while ignored the latter in the sense that they are essential for Israel security special those in Jordan Valley and Greater Jerusalem. Moreover, Rabin's government took certain symbolic gestures towards the Palestinians such as release small number of political prisoners. Despite these steps and the mood of optimism that prevailed, the talks in the sixth round were confronted with the concerned parties' position regarding issues under discussion. Palestinian insisted that the whole peace process including that of the autonomy should be based

and guided by Resolution 242, while Israelis contested that and argued UN resolution would be only applicable to talks on the final status of the occupied territories. Even in the subsequent rounds of talks the stalemate continued to prevail on the Israeli-Palestinian bilateral talks. Both parties failed to reach a compromise over the above-mentioned issue.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace talks at this stage suffered from the lack of active American role. The US was reluctant to intervene actively through pressuring Israel to soften its position. Moreover, Americans were busy in the presidential elections and its results. Although the new administration of President Clinton intensified its efforts to convince the parties particularly the Palestinians to resume talks, the latter remained suspended. The US retreated its commitments to the letter of assurance, which was provided to the Palestinian and announced that she is going to play the role of full partner in the Middle East peace talks. In reaction to this and motivated by their own interests, in March 1993, Palestinian decided to resume peace talks with Israel in Washington when the participated in the ninth round of the peace negotiation. Nothing of specific importance was achieved during this round of Talks. Israel remained reluctant to consider the West Bank and Gaza as occupied territories. Subsequently the US had submitted a proposal of an Israeli-Palestinian Joint of Statement to the concerned parties to break the stalemate. The basic lines of this proposal emphasis the centrality of the UN 242 and 338 resolutions as the basis of a final status which would be preceded by the interim period of a Palestinian self-government in the territories. The Palestinian rejected the American move on the ground that it did not referred to the West Bank and Gaza as occupied territories. The failure of this proposal to receive the consent of the Palestinian prompted the US to submit a modified proposal based on the idea of implementing the above-mentioned

resolutions in all their aspects. However, the ambiguity and vagueness that characterised this proposal particularly over the issue of East Jerusalem and the future of the occupied territories made the Palestinians rejecting it. Apart from procedural and symbolic progress it is probably true to say that the Washington talks between the Israelis and Palestinians between the period of 1992 and August 1993 had failed to produce something tangible. The talks fluctuated between stalemate, suspension and fruitless resumption.

The serious break through in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks took place as result of secret negotiation in Oslo that have been conducted from January 1993 and August 1993 between the PLO and Israel mediated by the Norwegians .

In January 1993 the first secret meeting in Oslo between the Israelis and Palestinians was held which marked the beginning of what is know as Oslo channel (Makovsky, 1996, p21). Both parties laid down the ground roles which were suppose to govern their talks which would be of explanatory nature to find ways and means that could help in advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. The parties conducted their meeting in a style completely different from that of Washington track. Both agreed that they should be realistic and ready to compromise. Palestinians had suggested that Israel as a gesture of its peaceful intention to withdraw its forces from the occupied territories should withdraw first from Gaza and that both parties should work towards a declaration of principles. The latter would facilitate the reaching of final agreement between Israel and the Palestinian. . Although it was a suggestion and lacked any prior commitment from both sides, the idea attracted the Israeli side particularly. Henceforth this idea becomes the main theme of the Oslo secret negotiation. In their subsequent meetings both Israelis and the Palestinian worked to develop the idea of Gaza first and to put the details of the suggested declaration of principles. Mutual

proposals were submitted which were evolving around the gradual transformation of certain authorities to the Palestinians in the occupied territories, withdrawal from Gaza and economic co-operation. With this degree of advancement and because of its promising prospects, the parties particularly the Palestinian now became interested to conduct the talks on an official level. Each side wanted to be sure that these talks were receiving a formal support. Therefore, formal officials from Israeli side joined the talks such as Uri Savir an Israeli high-ranking diplomat and the Palestinian negotiator were already PLO members (Auerbach and Greenbaum, 2000, pp48-49). In addition to the formality, the issues of suggesting another area from the occupied territories that Israel should pull out its forces from in addition to Gaza be also dominated the Oslo talks. Moreover, the creation of a corridor between these two areas, the level of authorities which would be granted to the proposed Palestinian self-government and the status of the Israeli settlements inside the occupied territories were also in the agenda of the talks. Although the Oslo channel witnessed ups and downs, in time it gained its momentum, Dynamics and became formally a negotiation between Israel and PLO in every sense. Moreover, the talks have produced tangible basis that enabled the parties by August 1993 to finalise their agreements. Both Israel and PLO have worked two agreements one known as Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements and the Letters of Recognition (Dajani, 1993, Pp5-7). In 9 September 1993 Rabin and Arafat exchanged letters of recognition. PLO has officially recognised the right of Israel to live in peace and security and accepted the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Moreover, the PLO committed itself to the Middle East peace process, to renounce the use of terrorism and violence. Furthermore, the PLO also accepted to relinquish the provisions of the Palestinian

Covenant which denies Israel's right to exist. Rabin's letter of recognition to Arafat stated the Israel recognition of the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people. The Oslo agreement was officially signed in Washington on the 13th of September 1993 in accordance with Clinton administration desire to host such an event. The provisions of the Oslo Agreement have evolved around the aims of the PLO-Israeli negotiation, the frame work for the interim period, elections for a Palestinian Council in the West Bank and Gaza, jurisdiction of the council and the transitional period and permanent status negotiation. Moreover, the agreement called for a preparatory of transfer of power and responsibilities in Gaza and Jericho areas from Israeli administration to the Palestinian and for a negotiation to implement the interim agreement. Furthermore, the agreement called for mutual co-ordination and economic co-operation between Israel and the Palestinian.

The reaction to the revelation of the agreement was varied from one party to the other. Apart from Hamas and Damascus based opposition groups, the agreement received the approval of a considerable part of Palestinian people and the PLO (Al-Ghabra, 1966, p16). Although Israeli opposition groups particularly the right wing opposed Oslo agreement with the Palestinian, it received the approval of the Labor-led government and a considerable part of the Israeli people (Auerbach and Greenbaum ,2000,Pp 48-49). Within the Arab world the reaction also varied from one country to another. Moreover, the agreement received a considerable support from most of the countries that are interested in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The importance of Oslo agreements to the Palestinian lied in the fact that it provided, for the first time, Israel's formal recognition of the PLO as a representative of Palestinian people which was one of the PLO aims (Shlaim, 1994, Pp 24-25). Moreover, the agreement has totally buried the formula of a joint Jordanian-

Palestinian team and enabled the later to negotiate the subsequent talks with Israel on equal footing as an independent actor in the Middle East peace process. For the Israelis, the significance of Oslo embedded in the fact that it received the formal recognition of the PLO and most of the Palestinian. However, the agreement had its own pitfalls such as its ambiguity and vagueness.

According to Oslo agreement, subsequent talks will be held to implement its provision particularly the phase, which deal with the Israeli forces withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho (Drake, 1994, Pp 1-4). The timetable which was set to negotiate and implement this stage was three months from the date of the signing of Oslo agreement. Therefore, shortly after Israel and the PLO began their bilateral talks in the region. Both parties chose Egyptian Taba City on the Red Sea as a venue for their talks due to geographical proximity and probably in appreciation for Egypt's role in the Peace process. The talks started on the 13th of October 1993 which was evolved around three issues, the defining of geographical realm of Jericho, the security arrangements and the release Palestinian political prisoners in Israel (Bearnann, 1994, p 131). Each party advanced its own understanding and interpretation of each issue under-discussion. The gap between the positions of both parties was wide. According to the Palestinian side the geographical area of Jericho is 390 sq. km referring to British mandate administrative area of the city. Israel presented counter understanding of the geography of the city evolved around the present municipal boundaries of Jericho City, which is 25 sq. km (cossali, 2005, p102). Moreover, the Palestinian side demanded that all the above-mentioned prisoners should be released. Israel who preferred to carry out this step gradually and after the establishment of a Palestinian police force rejected this. The thorny issue of security took many efforts from both sides (Rodenbeck, 1994, p8). Israel proposed that it would withdraw its forces from

Gaza and redeploy them in buffer areas around Gaza's Jewish settlement, which should be under Israeli protection and control. Moreover, Israel demanded that 20 check-points to be established alongside of the 1967 border with an Israeli control of the crossing points into and out of the autonomous areas. Palestinian contested these demands in the sense that the responsibility of security of these areas and the checkpoints should be theirs. The three months period to negotiate the above-mentioned issues passed talks without reaching an agreement in which both parties adhered to their positions. Unlike the Oslo talks the concerned parties conducted their negotiation with an intensive media coverage which made it hard for the parties to change or modify their positions fearing public anger (Makovsky, 1996, p145). The deal with the PLO precipitated fears to the Israeli public particularly right wing one that Rabin's government will make considerable concessions during the talks. Moreover, these fears particularly security ones were also enhanced as a result of mutual violence particularly that of Hamas. Therefore, Rabin was willing to pacify these fears when he chose military officials to conduct the negotiation (Makovsky, 1996, p144). The Background of those officials made it impossible to advance concessions to the Palestinians particularly in the security issue, which affected the peace talks. Arafat was facing internal problems with his group Fatah as well as a challenge from the opposition groups particularly Hamas (Aruri, 1994, Pp16-17). He was in need of considerable achievements that would enhance his leadership, which would make him able to deal with these problems. This situation affected the position and the performance of the Palestinian negotiators during their talks with Israel. They had to take positions to please and pacify Palestinian fears. However, the parties in early February 1994 during their talks in Cairo have reached an agreement in most of the previously mentioned disputed issues. Israel would maintain military control over

border crossings as well as veto over Palestinian visitors (Cossali, 2005, p 73). The Palestinian presence at these crossings would be limited to flags and other procedural matters. Moreover, it was agreed that Gaza area shall be divided into three sectors; Israel settlements and border with Egypt which would be under Israel's control, the perimeter of the settlements and access road to be jointly patrolled and the rest of Gaza which would be under the Palestinian control. However, there was no agreement yet over the size of Jericho. These achievements were shortly after confronted by a serious difficulty as a result of the Hebron massacre when Jewish extremist shot a number of Palestinians Muslims in late February. This incident overshadowed the negotiation which made Palestinian to withdraw from the talks (Fisher 2005, p583). However, the US interference and the economic agreement which was conducted between PLO and Israel in late April 1994 in Paris made it possible for the parties to resume their bilateral talks in Cairo (Bearman, 1995, p135). In May 1994 both Israel and PLO signed an agreement in Cairo which detailed arrangements for Palestinian-self rule in Gaza and Jericho. Israel will withdraw its forces from these areas and Palestinians will their own police force. Israeli military administration responsibilities of these two areas will be transferred to a Palestinian National Authority except external security and foreign affairs. Moreover, elections for Palestinian Council postponed until October 1994. Shortly after Israeli forces redeployed from Gaza and Jericho that paved the way to establish a Palestinian National Authority who opened its first meeting in Tunisia in late May. Meanwhile, talks between both parties continued to implement what was left of their Oslo agreement particularly the extension of Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank. On July 1994 Arafat and his aids arrived at Gaza which henceforth became his permanent base. What featured the subsequent period was that negotiations were continued to be

conducted alongside with a degree of mutual violence and terror between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel agreed to extend to the Palestinians the responsibility of education, health, tourism and taxation. Moreover, preparations for elections of the proposed Palestinian Council continued. Another matter that featured the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks in the remaining period of 1994 was the US involvement and international community to raise fund from donors for the development of the West Bank and Gaza. Moreover, developments on other peace track particularly between Jordan and Israel also overshadowed the latter's talks with the Palestinian. Although, both parties made certain achievements, contention characterized their talks during the rest of 1994 particularly security issue and timetable of Israeli forces withdrawal from other areas in the West Bank.

Finally, the details of these negotiations and to what they might develop, in the light of the restrict Israeli position; can not be isolated from the various developments on the Lebanese and Syrian tracks. Under the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and the impacts of these probabilities on the Israeli Palestinian track, especially the Arabic position on the light of stoppage of negotiations on the Syrian track which will lead to a relative restriction in the relationship with the Zionistic entity, which might have an impact on the Egyptian position which in its turn will strongly impact the Palestinian authority position.

However, this does not the importance of the serious and sensitive stage which the Palestinian problem passes in the light of the under going negotiations, and the Palestinian position which is ready to accept substantial and serious surrenders that impact the present and future of the issue, in the light of weak and distorted Arabic position that justifies to the Palestinian authority to present concessions under the plea of accepting what the Palestinian people accepts. No issue of the international or

national conflicts, obtained that huge much of decisions, initiatives, visions, imaginations as the Arabic Israeli conflict specially what is related to the Palestinian issue . In spite of what have faced this issue of acceptance, refusal support and denial, the issue remained still and got more complicated with passage of years. The peace process which was released in Madrid peace conference was imposed to hindrance in one time, and to freezing and fluctuation and deteriorations in many times. During the period faced all kinds of problems that might face any negotiation process in a multi parties conflict extended historically, either these problems were regarding procedural aspects or real aspects of the conflict.

After Netanyahu became the Israeli prime minister from the middle of 1999, the peace process suffered from the freezing and all the endures to move the negotiations forward concentrated at preventing its collapse, and not on the progress of the settlement track, the principle of land against land dominated instead of land against peace. Between the middle of 1999 and the beginnings of 2001, the settlement process has seen abnormal fluctuations because the settlement process was connected directly with the final solution issues on the three conflict tracks that are connected with the pales tenant issue, Golan heights and south Lebanon. In the light of the final solution problems and the active public opinion pressure, it was obvious that the maximum which Israel was ready to present under Barak's government was not sufficient or fair for the Palestinians (The strategic Arabic report 2000, January 2001, the political and strategic studies center, Al – Ahram corporation, Cairo, p224).

In 2001, a substantial change in the official attitudes occurred in Israel, regarding the extreme right that was strongly supported by the community when the right lickud Sharon's government took over in February of the same year. The deterioration was linked with the return of this extreme stream, therefore, the

settlement entered a blocked road year 2001, began under very important two developments of the conflict direction. The Palestine uprising which started in the end of September 2000 continued, and the previous American administration attempts to reach to an adjusted peace frame work, instead of what offered previously in camp David, July, 2000 (The strategic Arabic report 2001, strategic and political studies center, Al – Altram corporation, Egypt, January 2002, p291-297.) .

Regarding the uprising, the field of Palestinian Israeli conflict has seen a severe war if attrition lasted one thousand and five days, included Palestinian martyrdom operations, as a reply to the most violent Israeli bloody and brutal practices against the Palestinian people, which led to extension of the mutual killing circle, until number of martyrs reached (2002), and more than (200) Israelis killed (Mohammad Basha the truce of day one thousand and five days of the uprising, Ahram news paper) . This matter made on the ground a very important development, because both parties endured substantial losses while, the other variable, regarding the previous American administration endures to arrive to a peace framework, this also failed, which impacted the American administration vision about the conflict. It was not enthusiastic from the first place to be involved in the issue, until the eleventh of September 2001 events, and the beginning of the American war against terrorism dilemma, and the determination to deal militarily with Iraq and what accompanied that of Arabic and international refusal regarding the American sole behavior in all issues, which led to the American administration improvement of its picture internationally, or neutralizing some countries which opposed the war against Iraq.

Therefore, the American president speech on 24.6.2002 come to confirm the U.S.A commitment of the peace process in the middle east, and that it was ready to start a long way in order to reach to a solution to the Israeli – Arabic conflict.

While that speech was representing a general ideas, the quadruple committee which is consisted of the U.S.A, Russia, the European Union, and the U.N, and wrote these ideas in the form of a plan known as "road plan" in order to be presented to both parties, the Israeli and the Palestinian on 20 September 2002. However, the U.S.A postponed the announcement of this plan until the completion of the early Israeli elections, and after the Palestinians conduct the required reforms in the Palestinian authority and until it finishes the Iraqi file, after the Palestinian prime minister Mahmond Abbas came into office on 30.4.2003, president bush announced the road map, and sent his secretary of state Colin bowl in the beginning of May to the middle east to obtain the approval of both parties, the Israeli and the Arabic on that plan, after conducting some amendments on it (Osailah, 2003, p22) .

2.2:Israeli-Syrian Bilateral Peace Negotiation 1991.

The issue of achieving bilateral peace is a central them in the policies of both countries (Mandell, 1996, Pp 240-241). Syria believes that peace with Israel has become its strategic choice. Israel, particularly Labour-Led government, also sees peace with Syria as one of its vital aims that should be achieved. However, both held different perceptions of what peace means in term of its requirements, such as the nature of their expected relations, solutions to their disputed issues and what concessions should be made by both parties to achieve peace. Due to this contention the bilateral negotiation, which was conducted between both countries since 1991, witnessed ups and downs.

In the first stage of Syria's peace talks with Israel, the negotiation was conducted with the Likud-led government in which contest over the formula of peace, lack of seriousness and incivility were the main characteristics of this phase of

negotiation (Rabinovich, 1998. Pp 40-41). Therefore, there was a need for an American chairperson of the negotiation sessions. The lack of existence of minimum mutual trust and confidence between the two antagonists could be attributed to the deep mistrust that marked their relation and the fact that both never engaged in direct negotiations. On dealing with the issue of under which formula their talks should be conducted, both parties held different perceptions. Shamir's government advocated the "Peace for Peace" formula also when dealt with the peace talks with Syria (Ben-Meir, 1997, p 1). Israel at this stage refused to deal with the Syrian demand of conducting the talks on the bases of UN 242 Resolution which called for "Land for peace" formula. The continuous contention in the first five rounds of talks and lack of even a procedural progress could be attributed mainly to the lack of seriousness from Shamir's government in dealing with the peace talks. Moreover, the Syrians were firm in their position which did not accepted less than Israeli acceptance to discuss the issue of Golan Heights from "land for peace" perspective (Hartman, 1994, p 45). In the light of that no body including the parties themselves expected to have any serious breakthrough. Yet they continued their bilateral negotiation with cool enthusiasm. However, this cold conduction of Israeli-Syrian peace talks was substituted by a little bit warmth with the arrival of the Labor party and its allies to power in June 1992. This was because of Rabin's new approach when dealing with negotiation with Syria. With his security pragmatic vision, Rabin declared that UN 242 Resolution also applicable to the Golan Heights and the talks would be conducted on the bases of land for peace formula (.Fisher, 2005, Pp 943-944). Rabin was enthusiastic to engage in fruitful talks with Israel to strike a deal that would serve Israel's security interests. Therefore, when both parties resumed their peace talks in Washington during the sixth round of talks in 24th of August 1992, Israel

submitted to the Syrian formally its new approach (Rabinovich, 1998, p 57). The Syrian reaction to the Israeli step was a proposal declaration of principles. The Syrian draft emphasized the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace (Hinnebusch, 1996, p 52). Moreover, both parties would form a mechanism to implement these resolutions including full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in return for termination of the state of war, which would be incorporated in a peace agreement. Although the Israeli and the Syrian steps could be considered as a form of progress the gap between them remained wide. Israel believes for peace to occur with Syria the latter has to commit itself for full peace and takes bold steps for full normalization of the relations with Israel (Seal, 2000, Pp 66-67). Syria believe that to achieve peace with Israel the latter should declared its commitment to full withdrawal from the Golan Heights and that peace should be comprehensive in all peace tracks. Henceforth the disputes between both parties evolved around the extent of withdrawal, the nature of peace, security arrangements and the issue of a comprehensive peace. Israel in its acceptance of the element of territorial compromise with Syria did not elaborate on depth of its proposed withdrawal from the Syrian occupied land. Moreover, Israel believed that this would be occurred gradually with in timetable of five years to check the Syrian seriousness of peace. Furthermore, Syria has to offer Israel full normalization of relations which entail diplomatic and commercial relations. In regard to security issue Israel demanded that the demilitarization of the parts of the Golan Heights which would evacuate and its adjacent areas inside Syria. Moreover, an Israeli early warning station should be installed in these areas coupled with redeployment and reduction of Syrian forces. Israel also believed that the agreement with Syria should stand in its own foots without any linkage with other peace tracks particularly that of

the Palestinians. Syria believes that Israel should pull out its force totally from the Golan Heights till the border of the 4th of June lines and the dismantling of all the settlements there. Furthermore, Syria understands that peace with Israel would entail a degree of normalization. However, the Syria's position over this issue is vague like Israel's position from the extent of withdrawal. An analysis to the Syrian position from the issue of normalization suggests that it is different from that of the Israeli perception. Syria believed that UN Security Resolutions didn't talk about warm or cold peace. Therefore, Syria is not compelled to respond to the Israeli perception (Muslih, 1994, Pp 10-11). In respect to security arrangements Syria believe that, these steps should be reciprocal and on equal footing... The above-mentioned positions of both parties from their disputed issue are a by-product of different constants and elements (Ben-Meir, 1997, Pp104-110). Israel developed vested strategic and settlements interests in Golan Heights. The strategic importance of Golan to Israel security derived from the fact that it forms an ideal buffer zone between Israel and Syria. Moreover, Golan is rich of water resources and close to Israel's main water storage of Lake Tiberias. Furthermore, after 1967 many Israeli settlers settled in the Golan and established farms there. Those settlers enjoy influence and support from the Israeli body politic. What can be said about the strategic importance of the Golan to Israel would be the same to Syria whose capital Damascus is not far from the plateau. Moreover, Syrian people firmly believed that Golan is an integral part of their country. This sense is motivated by strong Syrian nationalism. Apart from his ideological national believe Asad has a personal motive to regain and insist on full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan. Therefore, returning the plateau would relief him from the responsibility of its loss. With the above-mentioned positions both parties conducted their subsequent talks. In the period

between June 1992 and December 1992 the parties conducted three rounds of talks (Rabinovich, 1998, p70). Apart from the application of territorial compromise from Israeli side and its subsequent Syrian proposal, nothing of specific importance has been achieved. The negotiation suffered from US presidential election and other regional developments particularly volatile situation in West Bank and Lebanon like other peace tracks (Rabinovich, 1998, p70). The Bush administration was actively engaging in the Israel-Syrian peace talks and was keen to help the parties reaching an agreement. The degree of Baker involvement in this track suggests that Bush Administration was giving it a priority over other tracks. Although other disputed issues are of significant importance, the issue of withdrawal and the extent of peace remained the main contentious ones during 1993. Both parties engaged in what be called a competition of finding acceptable formulas to satisfy their positions from theses issues. Israel talked this time of significant withdrawal from the Golan in return for full peace and that the extent of withdrawal determined by the extent of peace Syria would offer (Rabinovich, 1998, p83). This is off course was not acceptable by Syria who saw it as short of a commitment for full withdrawal. In reaction to that, Syria came up with a formal “Full withdrawal for full peace” (Seal, 1996, p36). Both parities were prisoners of finding suitable formula in the sense that each one wants to extract from the other a prior commitment that would satisfy his position before committing him self. Although no serious break through was occurred during this period, the nature of the talks were seen by the others as encouraging and were expecting both parties to reach an agreement. Moreover, the new US administration of Clinton’s actively engaged in the Syrian Israeli talks (Al-Moualem, 1997, p 83). The Americans truly played the role of an active mediator in which Secretary of State invested huge efforts that took the form of shuttling

between Syria and Israel. This is because of the American interest in helping the parties to reach an agreement. The American involvement and the revelation of the news of some progress in the Israeli-Syrian track gave the impression that both parties were close to strike a deal. This was also enforced by the hypothetical proposition, which Rabin offered to Asad through US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in August 1993 (Seal, 1996, p67). According to Syrian and American sources, Christopher had conveyed a verbal secret message to Asad from Rabin which stated the readiness of Israel for full withdrawal from Golan (Al-Moualem, 1996, p 82). In return for that, Israel security needs and normalization of relations are to be met. However, the OSLO agreement of 1993 between Israel and PLO has changed this image and negatively affected talks with Syria (Seal, 1996, p 35). The agreement stalled progress on the Syrian track in the sense that, Rabin government would not be able to sell out two agreements to the Israel people at the same time. It is easy to sell an agreement that entails partial withdrawal from West Bank rather than significant one on the Syrian front. Moreover, Israelis were in need of time to digest the agreement with the Palestinians. Therefore, Syria had to wait till the appropriate time which meant to freeze any serious talk for while (Hinnebusch, 1996, p66). Rabin saw in the agreement with the Palestinians as a mean to pressure Syria in the sense that it weakened the latter position and marginalized her role.

In the light of the above-mentioned developments, Rabin became less enthusiastic than before to his preference of "Syria first" (Al-Moualem, 1997, p 85). Instead he advocated the notion that now priority should be given to implement agreement with Palestinians and to strike a deal with Jordan. This was not shared by the Americans at this stage who believed that the momentum to the Syrian track should be maintained and that Rabin's next step is an agreement with Syria (Quandt, 1994,

Pp28-30). To achieve such goal the Clinton Administration moved and took a high profile step when Clinton held a summit meeting with Asad in Geneva in January 1994 (Fisher, 2005, p 944). At this meeting Syria had adjust her position from certain disputed issues with Israel. She accepted the principle of normal relations with Israel but conditioned to what will happened in the course of their peace talks. According to Clinton Asad had made a firm commitment to normalize relations with Israel including open borders, free trade and diplomatic relations (Muslih, 1994, p10). Moreover, Syria had submitted a new interpretation to the comprehensive peace in the sense that it does not mean agreements with Israel have to be reached simultaneously with all Arab parties. Moreover, Syria recognized that each of the problems between the Arabs and Israel has its own peculiarities. Oslo agreement made it easier for the Syrians to adjust their position over this issue. Henceforth, Syria focused on the issue of Golan.

The Syrian positive position as a result of Clinton-Asad meeting and the difficulties in the negotiations with the Palestinians made Rabin to revive his interest in the Syrian track (Muslih, 1994, p.11). He announced Israel's redness for significant withdrawal and dismantling of the settlements conditioned by public Israeli referendum. During that period the atmosphere of the bilateral talks between both Syria and Israel was positive and sense of optimism was created that something tangible is looming over. Many reasons contributed to this chief among them were the active American involvement on a high level in the talks. Moreover, Rabins new position which the Israeli press claimed that he expressed his readiness to have full withdrawal from the Golan. For instance Rabin publically stated that peace was more important than keeping certain settlements in the Golan . Furthermore, a considerable flexibility also occurred in the Syrian position.

These appropriate circumstances, made the Americans intensify their efforts to help the parties reach agreement through fractioning their disputed issues such as solving the core ones and begin negotiation over the secondary ones. The parties agreed over this suggestion and began tackling the thorny issue of the extent of withdrawal. Although Syria and Israel at this stage achieved a considerable progress compared with previous talks, both held different position over to which lines Israel should pull out its forces (Pipes, 1999, Pp 19-20). Syria believed that Israel should pull back to the lines of 4th of June 1967 of the Rhodes Armistice lines (Hof, 1997, Pp137-140). This would enable Syria an access to the Lake Tiberias and headwaters of the Jordan River. Israel insisted that the boundary lines should be that of the 1923 British mandatory lines between Palestine and Syria and that agreement should be reached over the water resources of the Golan (Hof, 1997, p 1360). In regard to the issue of timing of the it's forces from Golan, Israel proposed a three-stage withdrawal over a period of eight years after a minor pull back from certain villages (Pipes,1996,p 18). The logic behind this was that Israel through having such period would check how far Syria is keen to establish normal relation with it. Syria refused to accept such suggestion and demanded that withdrawal should be take place within short time of a maximum one year and refused normalization before the evacuation of Golan. In regard to the security issue, Israel in return for the intended significant withdrawal from Golan demanded certain security arrangements that would substitute leaving strategic plateau (Mandelll, 1996, Pp243-245). Israel proposed the dismantling of Syria chemical weapons, radical reduction in the Syrian army and limited forces zone requiring a virtual Syrian pull back up to Damascus. Although Syria accepted the principle of demilitarization of the Golan and the stationing of an international force, she demanded that equal limited forces zones should be on both sides of border

(Seal, 2000, p72). The parties failed to cement the gap between their positions in which Syria argued that agreeing on the Israeli demands would demolish her defensive ability. Israel insisted that by leaving the Golan it will risk its national security. Therefore, she was in need of such substituted measures.

However, the Israeli-Syrian talks received another blow which affected it negatively when Jordan and Israel concluded their peace treaty in October 1994 (Muslih, 1994, pp162-63). The same effect that Oslo had on the Syrian track probably the Israel-Jordanian peace treaty to a certain extent had.

2.3. Jordanian-Israeli Bilateral Negotiation, October 1991-September 1993.

During the Middle East peace process which began in 1991, Jordan conducted her peace track with two different Israeli governments, one led by Likud and the other by Labour. She held peace talks with the former from October 1991 until June 1992, and then began bilateral negotiations with the Israeli Labor government until the conclusion of the 1994 peace treaty.

The initial stage of the peace talks between Jordan and Israel was characterized by the domination of procedural contention over two issues. The first one concerned which location should be selected for the bilateral negotiations while the second issue related to the status of the Palestinian delegation. As a result, most of the time allocated for the Jordanian-Israeli talks was devoted to resolving this issue. This was because of the linkage between the Palestinian negotiation team with that from Jordan.

The failure of the negotiating parties to agree over venue of the negotiation prompted the U.S. to intervene and to invite them to conduct their bilateral talks in Washington D. C. on 4 December 1991 (Shlaim, 2008, p. 6.). Jordan and the other Arab countries as well as Israel accepted the offer. Meanwhile, as the talks started in

Washington D.C on 10 December 1991, the troubles and difficulties regarding the joint Jordanian-Palestinian track with Israel emerged. In continuation of her policy regarding the status of the Palestinians, Israel refused to negotiate separately with a Palestinian delegation (Fisher, 2005, p. 580.). The Likud government was concerned about making any gesture, which might be understood as recognition of Palestinian independence. Jordan supported the Palestinian position over this issue. The peace talks lasted until 18 December 1991 but the parties failed to reach an agreement over this issue. However, talks were resumed in Washington D. C. on 7 January 1992 where the parties reached a compromise solution over the procedural deadlock on the Palestinian-Israeli front (Eisenberg and Caplan, 1998, p. 82). Israel agreed to negotiate with two separate sub-committees consisting of nine Palestinians and two Jordanians on the Palestinian related issues and nine Jordanians and two Palestinians on Jordanian related matters. Thus, Jordanian-Israeli bilateral negotiations began.

Jordan's talks with Israel focused on the necessity of creating a procedural and managerial regime to govern their bilateral talks. With the conclusion of the discussion on the procedural regime, the parties moved towards discussing their vision of peace. As has been stated in the American letter of assurances to Jordan and the other Arab parties, UN Resolutions 242 and 338 formed the basis for the Middle East peace talks (Haddadin, 1995, p. 25.). Jordan therefore believed that the UN resolutions, particularly 242 should be applied to all Arab occupied territories including the West Bank and Jerusalem (Andoni, 1992, p. 3.). By contrast, the Israeli Likud government believed that Resolution 242 called for a withdrawal from some of the territories that had been captured during the June War of 1967.

Parallel to their bilateral negotiation Jordan and Israel participated in the Middle East multilateral peace talks that opened in Moscow in January 1992 (Peters,

1996, p. 8.). It was hoped that the multilaterals would facilitate the work of the bilateral in the sense that the former would generate mutual confidence and understanding among the parties (Kemp and Pressman, 1998, p. 14). The multilateral talks went side by side with the bilateral negotiation between Israel and the concerned Arab parties.

In regard to the bilateral talks, the Jordanian and Israeli negotiating teams returned to Washington on 27 April 1991 for the fifth round of their talks, which lasted until the 30th of the same month (Fact sheet: Middle East Peace Process- Meetings Following the Madrid Conference, *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 5, Issue, Supp. 7, August 1994, p. 44). Nothing of real importance was achieved and both parties remained discontented over the principles which would govern their talks. Moreover, the declaration of early Israeli general elections overshadowed the course of the peace process in general. In the light of this the parties did not expect any serious progress in their bilateral negotiation. The talks therefore lasted for only three days. The conclusion of this fifth round of talks marked the end of the first stage of talks between Jordan and Israel which achieved nothing substantive. As a result of the Israeli general elections a change had taken place in Israel which brought a new government led by the Labor party. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had a different political perception of the conflict to that of his predecessor. This change led to widespread optimism at regional and international levels and to a certain extent brought about progress in Israel's talks with the Palestinians and Jordanians.

As for Jordan, the advent of a Labour-led government was met with optimism and hope that real peace with Israel could be achieved. This reflected the long-held Jordanian belief that a peaceful settlement could be made only with a Labour-led Israeli government.

On 24 August 1992, the sixth round of talks was conducted in an atmosphere of optimism that the parties would be able to move into serious negotiations and to lay down the foundations for future progress (Susser, 1999 p. 11.).

Both Jordan and Israel engaged in active negotiation to narrow the gap on the agenda and lay down a general framework that would govern their future talks (Djerjian, 1992, p.747.). However, the sixth round of talks ended without a serious breakthrough on the Jordanian-Israeli peace track.

During the seventh round of talks which were held in two sessions in the period between 21 October and 19 November 1992, Jordan and Israel conducted fruitful bilateral talks that for the first time produced something tangible. They agreed on the agenda which would lay down the boundaries for an eventual peace. The content of the agenda was remarkable in the sense that it covered all their mutual issues ranging from economic questions to human contacts (Bearman, 1993, p. 117).

The tenth round of bilateral talks between Jordan and Israel, which was held on 15 June in 1993, coincided with King Hussein's visit to the U.S. during which he received American support for his peace efforts (Hawatme, 1993, pp. 6-7). The visit formed a new step in the restoration of Jordan's relations with the U.S. and brought it back to its normal position prior to the Gulf crisis. Meanwhile Jordan continued her policy of "wait and see" in which the Prime Minister Al Majali instructed the Jordanian negotiating team not to step ahead of the Palestinians bilateral talks with Israel. However, this policy ended when a surprise breakthrough took place in the Palestinian-Israeli secret track in Oslo in 1993. The success in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks took place as a result of secret negotiations in Norway that had been conducted from January to August 1993 between the PLO and Israel mediated by the Norwegians.

The revelations of the secretly negotiated agreement between Israel and the PLO in Oslo 1993 caught Jordan by surprise and she felt that she was betrayed by both parties (Fisher, 2005 p. 601.).

However, given Jordan's traditional position which advocated peace between Israel and Arabs, she was left with no option but to support the Oslo agreement. The agreement had a dual impact on Jordanian decision-makers and on the peace process with Israel. Jordan felt that the accord would endanger her interests, strategic aims and would marginalize her regional role (Eisenberg and Caplan, 1998, Pp. 93-94.).

The Oslo agreement triggered Jordan's fear that the PLO deal with Israel might mean the beginning of a process whereby she would gradually lose her geopolitical regional and international status (Susser, 1999, p. 14.) Therefore, to contain the potential negative impact of Oslo and to bring Jordan back into the regional political scene, she took an immediate step one day after the signing of the Oslo agreement in 13 September 1993. On 14 September Ambassador Eliakim Rubinstein, head of the negotiating team, as well as his Jordanian counterpart, Ambassador Fayez Tarawneh, signed the already-drafted Common Agenda in Washington D.C. (Tarawneh and Masalha, 2005, Pp 97-115).

Jordan and Israel agreed that this formal agenda would serve as a basis for their bilateral negotiations (“Jordanian-Israeli Common Agenda,” The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty: What Is It? (Amman: Jordan Media Group, 1995) . Although it was a bilateral agreement, the agenda called for the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace between the Arab countries, the Palestinians and Israel, based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their respects (Christopher and Posuvaluk, 1993, p. 2.). The agenda listed the topics, which were to be discussed bilaterally such

as water, security, borders and territorial matters, refugees and future regional co-operation (Lukacs, Israel, 1991, p. 189).

Despite the signing of the Common Agenda with Israel, the Oslo Agreement continued to overshadow Jordan's policy towards the peace process. In the aftermath of the signing of the Oslo agreement, Jordan decided that her policy of waiting for progress in the Palestinian-Israeli track had not paid off (Susser, 1991, p. 12).

In that light, Jordan formulated a new policy to deal with the peace talks with Israel. On 12 October 1993, the King's address to the nation expressed the strategy which Jordan was to follow in the aftermath of Oslo (King Hussein, Bin Talal, Address to the Jordanian people, 12 October 1993, Ministry of Information, Amman-Jordan.). The new Jordanian strategy was matched by clear Israeli policies in the aftermath of the Oslo agreement where Israel sought to move ahead in the peace talks with Jordan.

Therefore, on 3 November 1993, a secret meeting between Peres and King Hussein was arranged with the approval of Rabin (Lukacs, 1991, p. 192). Both parties drafted a document in which Jordan agreed to conclude a peace treaty with Israel in exchange for the latter's commitment to negotiate the re-allocation of water from the Yarmouk and Jordan rivers, and border demarcation.

Meanwhile, the Jordanian-Israeli talks, particularly the Trilateral Economic Committee encounters, continued. During these talks Israel submitted a draft of a peace treaty, but the Jordanians refused it and asked for position papers instead (Tarawneh and Masalha, 2005, Pp 97-115) .

Meanwhile, in late April 1994, the Israelis and the Palestinians signed an economic agreement (in Paris) and another accord in early May 1994 in Cairo for the implementation of the Gaza and Jericho agreement (Eisenberg and Caplan, 1998, p.

93.). This had the dual impact of reassuring the Jordanians that the Palestinian agreement with Israel was indeed being implemented, and arousing anxieties that Jordan was being excluded and marginalized on political and economic issues of great interest to her in the West Bank (Susser, 1991, p. 17). This again illustrated the limitations of co-ordination between Jordan and the Palestinians. The latter were perceived in Amman as doing as they pleased, choosing to inform Jordan only after the event, without showing concern for her interests. Thus Jordan decided to protect her interests by expediting the pace of peace talks with Israel. Henceforth the bilateral negotiation between Jordan and Israel witnessed an unprecedented acceleration. On 19 May 1994, King Hussein with his brother Prince El-Hassan, met Prime Minister Rabin and a number of his aides in London followed by two additional secret meetings between the two leaders in Tel Aviv (Rabinovich, 1997, p. 139). The aim of the meetings was to review the progress that had been made so far in their talks. Rabin declared Israel's readiness, for the first time, to grant Jordan a privileged position in looking after the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem in any future settlement (Shlaim, 2000, p. 541) . On his part, King Hussein agreed to a joint declaration of principles that would be followed by detailed negotiations for a peace treaty (Shlaim, 2000, p. 541.). On 7 June 1994 the parties resumed the work of the Trilateral Economic Committee (of Jordan, Israel and USA) when they held a meeting in Washington where Jordan and Israel agreed to move the talks back to their own countries (Tarawneh and Masalha, 2005, Pp 215-229).

Meanwhile, to prepare domestic opinion for the expected breakthrough with Israel, on 9 July the King publicly informed parliament that he was going to meet the Israeli Prime Minister. Both the Jordanian and Israeli negotiators held meetings on 18 July at their joint border, to finalize the agreement which their leaders were going to

sign (United States-Jordan-Israel Trilateral Economic Committee, *U. S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 5, Issue 31, August 1994, p. 16).

According to Dr Fayez Al-Taraweneh, Jordan and Israel agreed to sign the proposed accord on their joint border near Wadi Araba (Tarawneh and Masalha, 2005, Pp 215-229) . However, President Clinton invited both parties to Washington to sign their agreement there instead. This derived from Clinton's desire to highlight the significance of the American role, particularly his own efforts. King Hussein and Mr. Rabin accepted the American invitation as a gesture of appreciation for the U.S. role and efforts in the Middle East peace talks. On 25 July the parties formally signed what is known as the Washington Declaration at the White House (Ghali, 1994, p. 38) . This was followed by speeches delivered by both King Hussein and Mr. Rabin when they attended a joint session of the American Congress on 26 July (Rabin, 1994, Pp. 644-645.). This was perhaps an attempt to secure the approval of the Congress for the intended aid, particularly to Jordan.

With the signing of the Washington Declaration on the 25 July 1994, the bilateral peace talks between Jordan and Israel gained a new impetus (Stevens, 1994, p. 15). Towards the end of September 1994 Israel submitted a peace treaty in a draft form. The surprise in this proposal was the Israeli demand that Jordan should give priority to the potential peace treaty over her treaties with Arab countries (Tarawneh and Masalha, 2005, Pp 215-229.). The logic behind the Israeli demand was that she was concerned about Jordan's commitment to the Arab countries, particularly those dealing with security matters such as the Joint Arab Defense Treaty of 1957. The Jordanians rejected the Israel demand because such a step would have had serious implications for Jordan's relations with the Arab countries.

As far as other issues were concerned, particularly border demarcation, nothing of importance was achieved in the aforementioned peace talks in September 1994. To avoid deadlock in the talks and to accelerate the resolution for the remaining disputed issues, King Hussein and Premier Rabin had to intervene in October 1994. While the King and Prime Minister Rabin maintained supervision over their bilateral peace talks, the post-Oslo period witnessed a more direct involvement by both leaders in these negotiations (Shlaim, 1999, p. 18).

In mid October 1994, Premier Rabin, Foreign Minister Peres and the Israeli chief of staff visited Jordan and held a meeting with King Hussein, Prince El-Hassan and a number of Jordanian officials (Fisher, 2005, p. 602). The meeting lasted the whole night, during which the parties debated different proposals, particularly concerning the border and occupied territories. Israel accepted the principle, which highlighted the middle line of the Jordan River as applicable to its entire border with Jordan, but she demanded that this line should not be applicable to the Israeli farms within Jordanian occupied territories. The line should pass around these farms for which Israel would compensate Jordan by giving her Israeli land in other areas equal to these farms. Jordan refused this proposal and insisted that the borderline went straight from north to south, and these farms should be under Jordanian sovereignty. After hard deliberations that lasted virtually the whole night, King Hussein and Premier Rabin concluded an initial draft for a comprehensive Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. On 16 October, Premier Abdul Salam Al-Majali and Prime Minister Rabin initialed the peace treaty. On 26 October an official ceremony which was attended by the leaders of the concerned parties and President Clinton was held at the southern border crossing north of Aqaba (Wadi Araba) to sign the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel (Bearman, 1994, p. 129). Al-Majali and Rabin officially signed the peace

treaty on behalf of their countries. In attendance were President Bill Clinton of the United States, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the foreign ministers of Russia and Egypt, and representatives from several Arab countries.

In addition to the preamble, the treaty comprised thirty articles and five annexes (The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty: What is it? (Amman: Jordan Media Group, Publication, No.18, 1995). According to the treaty, Article 3 Clause 1 “The international boundary between Israel and Jordan is delimited with reference to the boundary definition under Mandate as shown in Annex I (a).” (“Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan October 26, 1994”) This meant that both parties accepted the boundaries that were listed in the British Mandate law of 1922 as their international border. Israel agreed to cede back all of Jordan’s occupied territories in the south as well as the north (Makovsky ,1994, pp. 158-160.). In the south, a border modification was agreed in which Jordan agreed to exchange thirty square kilometres of farmland for Israeli territories in the Araba border area. Jordan also agreed to grant the Israeli farmers in the Al Baqura and Al-Ghamer area private land use rights for twenty years, but these areas would be under Jordanian sovereignty with a special regime regulating the access of the Israeli farmers to them.

As for water, in Article 6, Clause 1 of the treaty the parties “agreed mutually to recognize the rightful allocations of both of them to Jordan River and Yarmouk River and Araba/Arava ground water in accordance with the agreed acceptable principle, quantities and quality as set out in Annex II which shall be fully respected and complied with.” (The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty: What is it? (Amman: Jordan Media Group, Publication, No. 18, 1995). Jordan obtained 50 MCM from the Yarmouk River to be stored in Lake Tiberias during winter which would be pumped to Jordan

every summer until diversion and storage facilities were built on the Jordanian side. Israel and Jordan agreed to co-operate in finding sources for the latter, an additional quantity of 50 MCM per year of drinkable water. They recognized that their water resources were not sufficient, so Jordan would be entitled to 12 MCM in exchange for the water wells in the Araba and Al-Baqura that the Israelis were using to irrigate their farms. Israel got the priority right to obtain 25 MCM from the Yarmouk River of which 13 MCM would be during winter and 12 MCM during summer (Hof, 1995, Pp. 47-57). Finally, the parties recognized that their water resources were not sufficient to meet their needs. New water resources had to be found through water projects with the help of the international community. In addition to the above-mentioned disputes, the treaty dealt with refugees and the displaced-person issue. According to Article 8, Clause 1 of the treaty “ Recognizing the massive human problems caused to both parties by the conflict in Middle East, as well as the contribution made by them towards the alleviation of human suffering, the parties will seek to further alleviate those problems arising on bilateral level.” (The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty: What is it?) The parties emphasized the necessity of solving this problem in accordance with international law (Hof, 1995, Pp. 47-57).). Furthermore, the parties agreed to form a quadripartite committee together with Egypt and the Palestinians to deal with the displaced persons issue and in the case of the refugees, the issue would be dealt within the framework of the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees. This group was one of the five groups that have been established within the framework of the Middle East multilateral talks set up in the wake of the Madrid Conference of 1991.

With regard to the Jerusalem issue, as stipulated in the Washington Declaration of July 1994, Israel acknowledged Jordan’s special role with regard to the Muslim holy shrines in the city. When negotiation on the permanent status began, as

mentioned in the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestinians in 1993, Israel agreed to give high priority to Jordan's historic role in these shrines.

With regard to the security issue, both parties agreed that each country pledged to ensure that no threats of violence against the other party would originate from within its territories and to take joint steps and measures to fight terrorism . Moreover, the parties committed themselves to the creation of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Middle East similar to the Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe. This body was to build a new security regime, to develop confidence-building measures, to prevent conflict, and to work within the context of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security to create a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction (Eisenberg and Caplan, 1998, Pp. 217-228). See also The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty: What is it? (Amman: Jordan Media Group, Publication, No.18, 1995).

The treaty called for the establishment of full diplomatic relations and the exchange of ambassadors and it provided for freedom of passage through border crossings, air space and territorial waters between the two countries. The two countries also declared the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba international waterways open to all nations for free navigation and over-flight and recognized the maritime border as their international border. The treaty called for the normalization of relations between them in different areas such as culture, education, science, crime and drugs, transportation and roads, postal services and telecommunications, tourism, the environment, energy, health, agriculture, the development of the Jordan Rift Valley and the Aqaba/Eliat region ("Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan October 26, 1994"). In the economic field, both parties pledged to conclude agreements to end the Arab boycott against Israel, to

establish a free trade area, joint investment, banking, industrial and labour co-operation

The Jordanian government presented the treaty to the parliament, on 5 November 1994 and the foreign affairs committee debated it (Fisher, 2005 p. 602). On 8 November 1994, both the Lower House and the Upper House ratified the treaty. (Tarawneh and Masalha, 2005, Pp 215-229).

Subsequently the King endorsed the Treaty, which automatically became a law. In Israel, the peace treaty with Jordan gained the approval of the majority of the Israeli people as well as their political groups (Cossali, 2005, p. 77.). It was passed with a wider margin than either the Camp David accords or the agreements with the Palestinians.

Conclusion

This thesis has aimed to analyze the American peace initiative of 1991 and the subsequent peace talks between Arabs and Israelis. However, many scholars have discussed this peace initiative and these subsequent peace talks between concerned Arab parties and Israel in which they focused on different primary and secondary variables of these talks.

The interpretation of the different variables of the American peace initiative has suggested their positive aspects as well as their limitations. The thesis has attempted to offer an analysis to the American peace initiative of 1991 and its subsequent peace talks through treating Arab-Israeli peace talks that started in 1991 as a dynamic process that was influenced by pre-existing and process factors related to the timing of the peace initiative, American role and disputants motives. To achieve this end, the study adopted a contingency approach encompassing all of these variables to determine their cumulative impact as well as the relation that existed between them.

This thesis also arrived at a conclusion that the American peace initiative of 1991 was a successful one. The American peace initiative of 1991 and the subsequent Madrid peace conference formed a relatively favourable environment to start a wider Arab-Israeli bilateral as well as multilateral negotiation in 1991. These talks consisted of the Arab-Israeli bilateral peace track and the multilateral talks that began in 1992. Moreover, the thesis arrived at conclusion that disputants particularly Arabs were highly motivated to accept the American peace initiative and to participate in the subsequent peace talks. Furthermore, although the initiative did not generate a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peaceful settlement, a number of peace agreements were produced particularly between Israelis and the Palestinians such as Oslo agreements

in 1993 and other subsequent agreements. It also resulted in the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of 1994.

The American peace effort of 1991 and the subsequent Madrid peace conference were part of the American role in the Middle East peace processes. The importance of the American peace effort and the Madrid conference to the Arab-Israeli peace talks was that the latter was initiated as a result of those two events. This thesis found that the U.S. played an important role in those talks. The nature of this involvement was far from the traditional role of an active mediator who had to engage directly in the negotiation between the disputants. However, the strength of the American role derived from the fact Arabs and Israelis were keen to keep the U.S. involved in these negotiation. This was so because of the U.S. status as a superpower and the political and economic leverage she had over Arabs and Israelis. In addition to the role of initiator, the Americans played the role of facilitator, supporter, aid provider and guarantor. Americans provided the venue for the parties to negotiate and sign some of their agreements, and they encouraged and supported the negotiation. The U.S. also supplied economic and military incentives to the parties, to induce them to accelerate the pace of their negotiation with Israel.

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مبادرة السلام الأمريكية لعام ١٩٩١ لحل النزاع العربي الإسرائيلي: دراسة تحليلية

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الملخص

تهدف هذه الرسالة إلى تحليل مبادرة السلام الأمريكية الصادرة عام ١٩٩١ وما تبعها من محادثات السلام بين الجانبين العربي والإسرائيلي، على الرغم من أن عددا من العلماء والباحثين قد ناقشوا هذه المبادرة وما تلاها من محادثات السلام بين المهتمين من الجانبين العربي والإسرائيلي مع التركيز على متغيرات رئيسية وثنائية مختلفة؛ إلا أن هذه الدراسة تتناول بأسلوب تحليلي ذات المتغيرات وفقا لإيجابيتها و مواقع قصورها بالنسبة لمبادرة السلام الأمريكية.

تطرح الرسالة تحليلا للمشكلة بوصفها عملية ديناميكية، كان لبعض العوامل القائمة سابقا تأثيرا عليها، بالإضافة إلى مؤثرات أخرى متعلقة بتوقيت مبادرة السلام، والدور الأمريكي، ودوافع المتنازعين.

تحقيقا لهذه الغاية، تبنت الرسالة المنهج الترابطي والذي شمل جميع هذه المتغيرات (أنفة الذكر)، لدراسة وتحديد الأثر التراكمي لها بالإضافة إلى العلاقات المتواجدة بينها. تقترض هذه الرسالة إن المبادرة الأمريكية للسلام عام ١٩٩١ كانت ناجحة، وفي خاتمتها تدل على نجاح لمبادرة السلام بانبثاق عملية سلام عربية- إسرائيلية موسعة، وعدد كبير من الاتفاقيات خاصة تلك المبرمة بين الجانب الإسرائيلي، والأردني، والفلسطيني.